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This study ascertains financing behavior and Capital Structure determinants of
a leading Jamaican corporation, Grace Kennedy Limited (GKL) in order to establish the
extent to which the company follows the Static Trade-off theory (STOT), in which an
optimal capital structure of the firm exists and can be derived by balancing the benefits
of debt against costs associated with debt i.e. Bankruptcy costs and Agency costs and
costs of underinvestment. STOT is compared with The Pecking Order theory (POT)
which firm has no specific target debt ratio and capital structure is driven by the need of
funds. The existence of Information Asymmetry, Signaling and relative costs associated
with alternative methods and sources of funding lead the firm to have a preferred
hierarchy for financing decision with the Internal Retained Earnings being preferred,
followed by Debt and then Equity. GKL's financing behavior arguably follows the STOT,
but more clear evidence supports the POT. The Firm has given preference toward the
following funding sources and Corporate Principles, Financial Flexibility,
Transactions Costs, Bankruptcy Costs, Credit Rating, Market Considerations and
Timing are all seen as important fundamental factors (Determinants) in deciding
about Capital Structure. Some concern is also given to Information about Asymmetry
problems at international level.
However, Agency Costs, i.e. Asset Substitutions, Wealth Transfers, and
Over-investment are not found to be issues of major concern, as the Firm has good
governance. Tax Shield benefits have no effect on the financial manager's decisions.
Also an Industry Norm is not found to be important for GKL's Capital Structure
decisions. The amount of debt in the Firm's capital structure is maintained at a low
level according to a conservative policy. It is also driven by corporate strategic
planning, and by the availability of profitable investments taking advantage of each
funding source.
v











1.4.6. The Structure of the Study















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction 8
2.2. Capital Structure Theory and Background 9
2.2.1. MM Proposition I with No Taxes 9
2.2.2. MM Proposition II with No taxes 10
2.2.3. MM Proposition I with Tax 12
2.2.4. MM Proposition 11 with Taxes 12
2.3. Theoretical Models 14
2.3.1. The Static Trade- Off Model Approach 14
2.3.1.1. Taxes and Benefits of Debt 14
2.3.1.2. Cost of Debt and Bankruptcy 15
2.3.1.3. Agency Costs 18
2.3.1.4. Agency Costs and Potential conflicts among Stakeholders 18
2.3.1.4.1. Potential conflicts between Managers and Shareholders. 18
2.3.1.4.2. Potential Conflict between Bondholders and Shareholders. 20
2.3.1.5. Implication of the Trade-Off Theory. 21
VI
2.3.2. The Pecking Order Theory Model 22
2.3.2.1. The Pecking Order Theory and Information Asymmetry 22
2.3.2.2. Pecking Order Theory and Signalling 24
2.3.2.2.1. Signalling with proportion of debt 24
2.3.2.2.2. Signalling with proportion of equity ownerships 25
2.3.2.3. Market Reaction to Equity and Debt Issue and Financing Theories 26
2.3.3. Empirical Results of Field Research Concerning the Pecking Order
Theory or the Static Trade Off and the Determinants 28
2.3.4. Market Timing and Financing Behaviour 31
2.4. Conclusion and Comments about the Theory 32
CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
3.1. Introduction





3.2.5. Growth and Growth Opportunities
3.2.6. Business Risks
3.2.7. Financial slack and management flexibility
3.2.8. Management values and Corporate Strategy
3.3. Conclusion
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY· GRACE, KENNEDY LIMITED
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Grace Kennedy, Limited and Fundamental Analysis
4.2.1 Macro Economy
4.2.2. Industry Analysis
4.2.2.1. Characteristics of Caribbean's Conglomerate Industry
4.2.2.2. GKL and Industry 'Five Forces' Analysis
4.2.3.3. GKL and Critical Success Factors





















4.2.3.1. GKL: External Analysis
4.2.3.2. GKL: Internal Analysis
4.2.3.3. GKL and Current Strategy to the Year 2005
4.3. Capital Structure and Grace, Kennedy Limited
4.3.1. GKL and Capital Expenditure
4.3.2. Investment Criteria
4.3.3. Capital Structure and Leverage ratios





4.3.4.5. Earnings vs. Dividends
4.3.4.6. Retained Earnings









































CHAPTER 5: QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN, ADMINISTRATION AND RESULTS:
FINANCIAL MANAGER'S PERSPECTIVE ON GKL'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE
5.1. Introduction 67
5.2. Questionnaire Design and Structure 67
5.3. Financial Manager's Perspective and GKL Capital Structure 68
5.3.1. SECTION 1: Attitude toward Funding Sources 68
5.3.2. SECTION 2: How Financial Manager Determines Capital Structure 70
5.3. Conclusion 74
CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF CASE STUDY
6.1 Introduction 75
6.2 Discussion of Results 75
6.2.1. Tax Benefits and Costs of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy 75
6.2.2. Agency costs and Capital Structure Decision 77
6.2.2.1. GKL and Conflicts between Managers and Shareholders 78
6.2.2.2. GKL and Conflicts between Bondholders and Shareholders 79
6.2.3. GKL and Attitude toward Funding Sources 81
6.2.4. GKL Information Asymmetry and Signalling 83
6.3. GKL and Static Trade-Off Model 84




7.2. GKL Financing Behaviour
7.3. GKL and the Determinants
7.4. Recommendations














Table 4.1 GKL and Capital Investment
Table 4.2 GKL and Earnings and Dividends
Table 4.3 GKL and Retained Earnings during the period 1998-2002
Table 4.4 GKL and Market Capitalisation
Table 4.5 GKL and Sales
Table 4.6 GKL and Profitability ratios during the year 1998-2002
Table 4.7 GKL and Taxes
Table 4.8 GKL and Tangible assets
Table 4.9 GKL and Growth Aspects
Table 4.10 GKL and Market-to-Book ratio
Table 4.11 GKL and Internal liquidity
Table 4.12 Degree Combined Leverage
Table 4.13 GKL and Financial Risk ratios

















I LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 MM Proposition 11 with No Taxes
Figure 2.2 MM Proposition 11 with Taxes
Figure 2.3 The Optimal Capital Structure, Tax benefits and
Costs of Bankruptcy








































Capital structure issues have been a key problem of modern financial theory
during the last decades. The contradiction between traditional view and modern
views on the existence of an optimal capital structure has given rise to
researchers looking for an ultimate answer that can be used as guideline for
choosing their optimal capital structures which will maximize shareholders' value.
This study seeks to examine and understand the concept of capital structure
from a managerial perspective based on the two well recognized theories, the
Static Trade-Off and the Pecking Order Hypothesis. This study also attempts to
examine the financing behaviour of companies, how managers make capital
structure decisions, and what factors and processes influence companies to
make their decisions in this respect. Which theories would best describe how
firms determine their financial policy in practice?
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
According to academic literature reviews, an optimal capital structure does
exist. To create an optimal capital structure is essential for any business entity.
Decisions in this regard are important not only because of the need to maximize
returns for various shareholders, but also because of the impact such decisions
have on a company ability to deal with its competitive environment. MM (1958)
stated on the basis of a restrictive set of assumptions (capital market is perfect)
that capital structure is irrelevant to the firm value. Hence, value of the firm is
unaffected by its financial mix. The authors suggested that it does not matter how
the firm finances its operations. This statement has been challenged and
debated among researchers because MM's propositions were based on an
unrealistic set of assumptions:
1. There are no brokerage costs
2. There are no taxes
3. There are no bankruptcy costs
4. Investors can borrow at the same rate as corporations.
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5. All investors have the same information as management about the firm's future
investment opportunities.
6. EBIT is not affected by the use of debt.
On the basis of the above assumptions, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that
Capital Structure is irrelevant for the value of a firm in the absence of market
imperfections that occur in the real world. Examples of these are taxes,
information asymmetry, transaction costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984); agency
costs, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and cost of bankruptcy and financial distress
(Myers, 1986), financial flexibility (Donaldson, 1961);
Modigliani and Miller (1963) extended their study. They suggested that firm
value is independent of its capital structure except for value added by tax shield
on interest payments. This implies that an "optimal" capital structure is one where
capital is 100 percent financed by debt. In practice, the debt levels of
corporations in the UK used only a modest amount of leverage with debt making
up 25 percent of total capital. In contrast, the U.S. corporations had increased the
use of debt in their capital structures from 47 percent in 1972 up to 60 percent in
1991. The two largest retailers, Federal Department Store and R.H. Macy, were
forced to declare bankruptcy as the result of their excess use of debt (See
Eugene, 1999). Remolona (1990) conducted a study of leverage trends in
various countries. He found at firms are not financed by 100 percent of debt.
German, French and Japanese firms appear to have the sharpest declines in
leverage. British firms have kept their leverage from falling. As for the U.S. firms
the rise in leverage was caused by different types of behaviour (i.e. some cash
rich firms borrowed heavily to repurchase their stock, instead of using this debt
for investing)
This evidence is at variance with MM propositions. If debt is beneficial for firms
as gaining value from tax advantage, why are most companies not leveraging
themselves at 100 percent debt? What would be the right proportion of debt that
a company should include in its capital structure? What factors are considered by
financial managers to establish the optimal capital structure of debt for the firm?
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Should firms be financed by debt or equity? And how much of each would create
the right mix of capital?
According to theorists, the financing behavior and approaches have been built
around two theories. Firstly, a Static Trade-Off Theory (STOT) (see, e.g. Myers,
1984) explains financing activity in terms of movement towards a target capital
structure, where the target is derived by balancing the tax benefits of debt
financing and the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. Secondly, the
Pecking Order Hypothesis, where there is no optimal capital structure, but firms
finance their investments according to relative costs of alternative methods with
the internal retained earning being preferred, followed by debt and then equity.
The Pecking Order Theory (POT) supported by Stewart Myers (1984), is based
on the comprehensive survey by Gordon Donaldson (1964) of how corporations
actually structure their financing and Myers and Majluf (1984).
The variability of results of empirical studies and the lack of agreement between
researchers on the determinants of capital structure, have led to this case study
which intends to ascertain more understanding on a Jamaican firm's behavior
and approaches in making decisions as regards to its optimal financial capital
structure, and the extent to which the firm follows the Static Trade-off theory or
the Pecking Order Theory.
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The study intends to explore and investigate the factors and the determinants of
capital structure under the following objectives:
To gain an understanding of how a major Jamaican firm behaves in making its
financing decisions.
To ascertain the factors that influences the choice between debt and equity
financing. (i.e., Taxes, Information asymmetry, Agency cost, Signalling and
Control issue) and the kind of approach used by the company to come to a
decision.
To explore and investigate the extent to which the company practices have met
theory in optimal capital structure decisions.
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1.4. RESEARCH DESIGN
This section gives a description of the research design. The sample, data
collection method, limitations of the research and the structure of the study will
be discussed.
1.4.1. Sample
Grace Kennedy and Company (GKL) is one of Jamaican largest publicly held
conglomerates, with six divisions and approximately 62 subsidiaries and
associated companies. GKL has a diversified range of business units spanning
the sectors of finance, maritime, food trading, remittances and retail and trading.
The company operates in Jamaica, the wider Caribbean, Latin America, Canada,
New York and Miami. The company has been selected because access has
been granted, and it possesses most of the important variables (as proposed by
various researchers in their empirical studies) that can facilitate the objectives of
this study.
1.4.2. Data Collection Method
Methods of collecting data involved the following: In analyzing this study a case
study method is used. Exploratory research for gathering information related to
capital structure decisions will be carried out. According to Holme and Solvang
(1991), the secondary data is divided into two categories, i.e., internal sources
and external sources. Internal sources refer to information inside the company
under study. External sources refer to information outside the company.
Internal data will be taken mainly from the annual reports of Grace Kennedy
Limited, from 1998 to 2002 .The information from the financial annual report,
company records, balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements
are analyzed within the period of 5 years' performance from 1998 to 2002, in
order to obtain the picture of the company's position relating to firm's size, asset
structure, profitability, growth, volatility and tangibility.
External data was collected from The University of Natal Library, and the
University of The West Indies Library. Inter-library and Internet were also used to
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access books, journals and articles of previous studies both theoretical and
empirical for the literature review. The exploratory study will provide sufficient
understanding of the determinants of financial policy decisions, to permit the use
of a semi-structured questionnaire.
A semi-structured interview is used as this method allows the interviewer to gain
more in-depth information as regards the rationale behind the chosen financing
policy. This technique is suitable for the topics under investigation as
recommended by Burton (burton@dundee.cs.uk.)
1.4.3. Procedure
~ The procedure can be summarized as follows:
~ Select the company listed on the JSE (Jamaica Stock Exchange).
~ Computation of information given from balance sheet, income statement
and cash flow statement to get the picture and trend of the company. The
analysis of this information will be used to provide more insight as a basis
to understand why the company selects a particular capital structure
policy. (Growth opportunities, Assets structure, Profitability, Retention
ratio, Return on Assets, Taxes, etc.).
~ The financial ratios are compared with previous year performance and to
Neal and Massy Ltd, a company in the same conglomerate industry.
~ Design the questionnaire, based on the literature survey
~ Write a letter via email to request for cooperation and then telephone to
make an arrangement for interview.
~ Conduct interview, analyse the data and interpret.
1.4.4. Limitation
~ Information about some particular issues may be difficult to obtain from
the respondent, as the company may be reluctant to disclose too much
information, e.g., about tax planning. This would be too sensitive an
issue.
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~ The information gathered from previous records may not be valid, as they
are historical data. The information from balance sheet and income
statement of the company may not indicate the real facts about items,
which are considered for computation as they may be manipulated for
accounting purposes.
~ The results from this study will apply only for this particular company and
at this particular point in time. Therefore, the findings do not necessarily
apply for other companies within the same industry, because they may
have different characteristics, i.e. size, profitability, earning volatility, debt
capability, assets structure and so on.
1.4.5. Ethical requirement
~ The procedure and purpose of the interview will be explained to the
respondent
~ The information will be confidential.
~ The results and findings will be shared with the company
1.4.6. The Structure of the Study
The study consists of five main chapters. The first discusses the conception of
the study and its background. The second chapter discusses the general theory
behind capital structure decisions. This chapter presents the theory of Capital
Structure, the determinants of The Static-Trade-Off and the Pecking Order
Hypothesis as well as findings on how firms establish their optimal Capital
Structure. The third chapter deals with Capital Structure inside an organization.
In this chapter we will see how Grace Kennedy Ltd. plans and executes financing
policy. The fourth chapter evaluates the gap between the theory and the
company's practices in relation to the Capital Structure theories. Finally,
conclusions and recommendations will follow.
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1.4.7. Impact and Benefit of This Study
This study will shed light on how a major firm goes about synthesizing structure.
Much work has already been carried out by comparing debt to equity ratios
through cross sectional analysis or other comparisons from previous researches.
There is some objection that theoretical models cannot explain how a firm should
act when determining financial policy. This study will complement existing studies
since we investigate important factors that determine capital structure of Grace
Kennedy Limited. Further contribution will be the suggestion for Grace Kennedy
Limited how the company could further improves its current capital structure by
incorporating theoretical models and empirical findings.
1.5. CONCLUSION
This chapter is mainly to give an overview of the study. The main purpose of this
case study is to gain insight into how firms behave in making their financing
decisions related to the determinant factors and manager's approaches in
deciding which type of funds to be used to finance firms' investment. Research
objectives, design and limitations were also stated. The next chapter will take us
through the two main theories which have been used to describe a firm's
financing behaviour. The determinants of an optimal Capital Structure will be
discussed including the past research findings related to these factors.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to present theories concerning Capital Structure
and to present empirical findings. This knowledge is necessary to understand the
case study analysis. The theory will be incorporated and discussed along the
lines of two theories, Static Trade Off theory and the Pecking Order Theory.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Businesses need capital to keep their operation alive. Capital is required to
finance investment in working capital, plants and machinery and so on. Financial
managers must decide how their firm should raise capital. There are various
source of capital available such as internal retained earnings, short-term bank
debt, long-term public issues debt, common shares and preferred shares. Most
firms rely on debt and equity capital and the proportion of each component of
capital used by the firm characterizes the firm's capital structure. An important
decision a financial manager must make is what would be the optimal proportion
of debt and equity of the firm that lead the company to achieve its goal of wealth
maximization. Does an optimal capital structure exist? The discussion in the
literature relates to how firms determine their capital structures and centers
around two models: The Trade-Off Theory (target adjusted model) and the
Pecking Order Theory.
The Static Trade-Off Theory (STOT) considers the impact of taxes, and financial
distress and agency cost upon capital structure decisions, in order to explain
management motivations and market perceptions. Includes considering the
impact on these decisions which concerns managers regarding the report
requirement to access capital markets. The target adjusted model believes that
there is an optimal capital structure and firms are financed in such a way as to
move toward the target. Firms seek level of debts by balancing the tax benefits
against costs of financial distress and bankruptcy. (see Harris and Raviv, 1991).
The Pecking Order Theory (POT) believes that the optimal capital structure does
not exist. Firms have preference toward internal over external source of financing
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and debt rather than equity financing when internal cash flows is not sufficient to
fund capital expenditure, which can be explained by three possible causes: 1)
management's attempt to avoid market monitoring
(Donaldson, 1961); 2) the differences in transaction costs (Myers, 1984); and 3)
the existence of information asymmetry (Myers, 1984) and (Myers and
Majluf(1984). The firm's leverage is determined by the strength of the firms' cash
flow (Jensen, 1986).The traditional Trade-off model is useful for explaining
corporate's debt levels, the Pecking Order Theory is superior for explaining
capital structure changes. Combining the two theories as broad base of theory
and practice will enable us to understand the determinants of the firm in making
financing decision and how firms approach such decisions. (Liesz, 2000)
2.2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY AND BACKGROUND
2.2.1. MM Proposition I with No Taxes
Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) stated that the value of the firm cannot
be changed by changing the proportion or types of its capital structure. There is
no capital structure that is better or worse than other capital structure. The
assumptions which based this argument are explicitly or implicitly that:
1) There are no taxes (personal or corporate)
2) All corporations are in the same class of risk
3) Corporations use only two kinds of securities (risky equity and risk-free
debt)
4) There is no friction in capital markets. Securities can be bought or sold
immediately and without costs
5) Individuals can lend or borrow at a risk-free rate
6) Bankruptcy bears no costs
7) There is no growth. Cash flow streams go on forever
8) Information is the same for all, corporate insiders and the public
9) There are no agency costs. Shareholder's wealth is always maximized
by the managers.
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When all the above assumptions are fulfilled:
VI =Vu
Where
VI = Value of levered firm
Vu = Value of un-levered firm
(equation 2.1)
This is known as M&M Proposition I, where the value of levered and un-levered
firms is the same. Thus, the total value of a given firm does not depend on its
Capital Structure (M&M 1958). The question arises whether or not the above
assumptions are realistic enough. In this scenario investors are able to do
everything that is done by the firm (called "home-made leverage"). This principle
is generally accepted as the starting point of modern managerial finance. It is
also thought of as one of the most important findings for corporate finance (Ross
et ai., 1993). Proposition I is proved by the strength of "home-made leverage".
(Appendix I)
2.2.2. MM Proposition 11 with No Taxes
On the basis of Proposition I it follows that the return of a given portfolio
containing all the debts and equities of a firm is constant (see equation 2.2.).





D = a firm's debts
E = a firm's equities
rA = Return on asset is constant (whatever the Capital Structure).
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Some call the above principle "Weighted Average Costs of Capital" (WACC),
Copeland and Weston, 1992). From equation 2.2, MM proposition 11 is obtained,
which can be seen in equation 2.3.
rE = rA + Of E * rA- rO (equation 2.3)
On the basis of the M&M Proposition 11 it can be concluded that Return on
Equity relates positively to leverage, while risk rises simultaneously. Assuming
that rA does not change in any given Capital Structure, and that return on debt
(rO) is constant, the Return on Equity (rE) can be calculated for the various kinds
of Capital Structure. As the company's WACC (rA) is constant (see M&M
Proposition I), the value of its total capital cannot be changed. Also, on the basis
of Proposition 11, the rate of Return on Equity rises together with the increase of
leverage. This is due to the increase of risk with leverage. If the company
changes from an un-levered structure to a levered structure, the operating
income is divided on a reduced amount of outstanding shares which is followed
by a larger Re. rE increases together with risk (M&M 1958). (Figure 2.1)







Fig. 2.1 illustrates that rE does not influence in any way an optimal Capital
Structure. There is no problem to increase rE via borrowing, however, the
11
increase in rE is offset by the increased risk. WACC is always constant even
when a firm changes its Capital Structure, which shows that leverage is of no
advantage for such a firm.
On the basis of the above considerations it can be said that the cost of Capital
cannot be decreased by changing from equity to debt, although it appears less
expensive. When companies increase debt, equity is rendered more risky. Also,
costs of equity capital rise in parallel. Increasing equity capital costs are
countered by the higher portion of the firm financed by low-cost debts. The
general value and the overall capital costs of a firm are invariant (not changed)
by leverage as can be seen by the constant WACC.
2.2.3. MM Proposition I with Taxes
Propositions I and 11 without taxes are not realistic because governments
allow for debt financing to be tax-deductible. It follows that a levered firm pays
less tax compared with companies that are equity based. Therefore, the overall
debt plus equity is greater for a levered firm as the value of a levered firm is
equal to the value of an un-levered firm plus the present value of the tax shield
provided by debt. (See equation 2.4.).
v = Vv + Tc
v =firm's value
Vv = value of un-levered firm
Tc =Present Value of tax shield
(equation 2.4)
The market value of a firm increases when it takes on more risk-free debt when
the assumption of no tax is relaxed. It follows that a firm should take on 100
percent debt to maximize the value of the company.
2.2.4. MM Proposition 11 with Taxes.
Proposition 11 with no taxes shows that there is a positive relationship
between expected return on equity and leverage. Equation 2.5 shows that the
same holds when we add corporate taxes (Tc).
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Re = rA + Qj1-Tc)*(rA-rD)
E
WACC (with taxes) can be calculated with equation 2.6:
(equation 2.5)





High leverage lowers WACC in a corporate tax scenario (Figure 2.2). Compare
this with WACC remaining constant although leverage has increased (Fig. 2.1).
Thus, the value of a firm is assumed to rise together with higher leverage
because WACC will decrease (under the assumption that corporate taxes exist).
It follows that an increasing amount of debt is accompanied by a higher value of
the firm. Thus, a 100 percent debt financing ought to be implemented (Copeland
& Weston, 1992).






It should be noted that the M&M propositions are based on very restrictive,
unrealistic assumptions. For example, M&M Propositions do not consider costs
of bankruptcy, which do exist in reality.
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2.3. THEORETICAL MODELS
Realistic or not, the M& M propositions have been a starting point for the
understanding of Capital Structure, spawning two basic models: i.e. 1) the Trade-
off Model, and 2) the Pecking Order Theory. The Trade-off Model is the only one
that has created a formula for calculating an optimal Capital Structure. Model 2 is
based on observations and the explanation of special patterns; it cannot
calculate optimal Capital Structure levels (adapted from Copeland & Weston
1992).
2.3.1. The Static Trade- Off Model Approach
The Static Trade- off theory (POT) approach was derived from Modigliani
and Miller (1958), the capital structure irrelevance hypothesis, combined with the
effect of taxes, financial distress, and Agency costs. The Trade-Off Theory
recognizes that target ratio does exist and may vary from firm to firm. It is the
optimum mix of debt and equity, where firm value can be maximized by
balancing the marginal benefit of lower taxes with the marginal cost of financial
distress. To balancing the Agency costs of debt and equity against its benefits.
2.3.1.1. Taxes and Benefits of Debt
MM (1963) suggested that the optimal capital structure of a firm should be
the one which is 100 percent debt financed as the firm value is increased by the
present value of tax shield. Tax reduction gives a firm an incentive to issue debt
over equity. Graham (1996) in consistent with Mason (1990) argued that firms
with high expected marginal tax rate tend to have higher debt level in their capital
structure than firms that are not have such benefits. Thus, firms which are not
benefits from tax shield on interest payments are less likely to use debt finances.
For example, firm with high level of Non-Debt-Tax- Shield in form of Depreciation
and Investment Tax Credits (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) and Firms with Tax-
Loss-Carry-Forwards are much less likely to use debt in their capital structure
due to firm tax saving capacity has already been exhausted by Non-Debt-Tax-
Shield expenditures. Debt has the potential to increase the firm's value and lower
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the Cost of Capital. There is danger when an excessive use of debt occurs. That
is the potential costs of financial distress and bankruptcy.
2.3.1.2. Cost of Debt and Bankruptcy
In spite of MM proposition, Myers (1984) argued that, in practice, most
companies do not finance purely by debt due to the concerns of costs of financial
distress and costs of bankruptcy which occur because of excessive use of debt.
Financial distress is a situation where a firm's operating cash flows are not
sufficient to satisfy current obligations such as trade credits or interest expenses
causing the firm to take corrective action (Wruck, 1990). Costs associated with
such a situation are high causing damage to the firm and its stakeholders by
reducing the value gained from tax of increasing debt levels, consequently
driving down the firm's market value.
Warner (1977) classified the Bankruptcy costs into two categories. Firstly,
Direct Costs, involving legal and accounting fees, reorganization costs, and other
administrative expenses, include the costs of physical deterioration. Secondly,
Indirect Costs, which are less tangible such as costs relating to the perception of
creditors, customers and suppliers, this also includes the inability of management
to focus on their business as they have to divert their efforts and resources from
maximizing firm value to halt a deteriorating situation. For example, "Chrysler
Corporation's near bankruptcy caused management to devote a great deal of
time and expenses to rebuilding the public's confidence in its ability to continue
operations. Other examples of indirect difficult to measure costs are lost sales,
lost profits, higher cost of credit, and the inability to invest in profitable
opportunities because external funding sources are not available" (Cited by Rao,
1987: pg 444).
Jerold Warner (1997b) collects data for 11 railroad bankruptcies that
occurred between 1933 and 1955 in an attempt to measure the magnitude of
bankruptcy costs. He found that direct costs such as lawyers and accountants'
fees, and value of managerial time spent in administering the bankruptcy cost
were small, ranging from 1 to 5 percent of the firm market value to seven years
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prior to and just before bankruptcy. There were economies of scale in going
bankrupt, as a percentage of firm value. Larger firms have lower bankruptcy
costs compared with smaller firms. Thus, Warner suggested that the direct costs
of bankruptcy are less important for capital structure decisions of large firm than
of smaller firms. But Warner's results are inconclusive as indirect costs relating to
other stakeholders are not measured; nevertheless, the evidence suggests that
direct costs may not be large enough to be an important determinant of optimal
capital structure.
Haugen and Senbet (1978) argued that bankruptcy costs are not relevant
to determining a firm's value, reasoning that these costs are of no concern for
anyone other than firms' shareholders and bondholders. Bankruptcy costs have
no bearing on the relationship between the firm and its suppliers or customers.
Therefore it should not be considered for capital structure decisions.
Altman (1984) provided the evidence on the indirect costs of bankruptcy as the
opportunity costs which are difficult to estimate. His evidence came from the
study of 19 firms (12 retailers and 7 industrials), that underwent bankrupt
between 1970 and 1978. He compared expected profits, computed by regression
from time series, with actual profits. The average indirect bankruptcy cost were
8.1 percent of firm value prior to bankruptcy and 10.5 percent on the year of
bankruptcy. The other method used unexpected earnings from analyst forecast
for a sample of 7 firms that went bankrupt in the period of 1980-1982. The
average indirect costs of bankruptcy were 17.5 percent of value prior to
bankruptcy. He concluded that all things considered, the direct costs and indirect
costs associated with financial distress are high and sufficiently large, therefore,
bankruptcy costs should be taken into consideration in capital structure is
determined.
Financial distress typically occurs in firms which have a large amount of
debt financing. Hence, the greater the use of debt, the larger are the fixed
interest charges and the greater is the probability of facing financial difficulties
which leads to decline of earnings as reported Earning per Share (EPS). This is
because the market is perceived to have added more financial risk to the firm.
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Thus, investors demand higher rates of return on their capital. Therefore, with the
costs of bankruptcy, a levered firm's value is lower by the present value of
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Figure: 2.3. The Optimal Capital Structure, Tax benefits and Costs of Bankruptcy
At a lower level of debt the probability of bankruptcy is low and firm value will
increase with leverage due to the benefits of debt tax shields. A firm's value
increases with increases the use of debt resulting in more gain on the present
value of tax shield on debt interest payments. On the other hand, the probability
of financial distress and bankruptcy increases with the level of debt to equity
ratios causing a negative effect on the value of the firm which affects the value of
tax relief for increasing debt levels. After a "reasonable amount" of debt, the
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presence of bankruptcy cost begins to affect the firm value adversely even
though tax shield benefits continue to increase with relatively more debt .The
optimal capital structure is the point where trade off between benefits gain from
adding debt into capital structure offsets the extra costs associated with potential
bankruptcy and financial distress, At this point the firm's value is maximized
(Myers, 1986).
2.3.1.3. Agency Costs
Agency costs are defined as problems which arise because a separation
between ownership and control of corporation and the role of financial contracts
in creating and controlling agency problems. Managers or "an agent" whose
actions influence both his own welfare and that of others are empowered by the
owners of the firm that are shareholders to make decisions. However, managers
may have personal goals that compete with shareholders' wealth maximization.
When firms consider whether to issue debt or equity for their capital expenditures
they have to face agency costs associated with these two sources i.e., cost of too
much equity is possibility of wealth transfers from shareholders to the managers,
and cost of too much debt is asset substitution, and under-investment probability.
Thus, the firm's optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading off these
agency costs of equity or debt against its benefits. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
2.3.1.4. Agency Costs and Potential conflicts among Stakeholders
Agency conflicts can be classified into two categories as follows:
2.3.1.4.1. Potential conflicts between Managers and Shareholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated the financing decision is influenced by the
concern of the potential agency problem which arises because managers of the
firm own less than 100 percent of its residual claim. Consequently, they do not
capture the entire gain from the profit enhancement activities, but they do bear
the entire cost of these activities. Therefore, the manager can invest with less
effort in managing firms' activities and resources, and they can even transfer
those resources to themselves, for example, by consuming "perquisites" such as
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a luxurious offices and vehicles, private jet, and building "empire" and so on and
these agency costs of equity are borne by shareholders. Thus, potentials
problem of wealth transfers from shareholders to managers through managerial
perquisites are trade off against the benefit of cheap debt. Jensen (1986) argued
that management does not automatically seek to maximize return on capital as
the investors wish them to do. Instead they are interested in projects that aim to
pursue growth rather than profitability, and for them to gain benefit through larger
compensation which are associated with size of the firm. This is supported by
Wildsmith (1974) who found that for a large corporation potential agency conflict
is more important as managers own only small fraction of stock and
shareholders' wealth maximization may not be a first priority of manager
decisions. Instead, manager's primary goal seemed to be to maximize the size of
their firms.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided the advantages and likely reasons for
managers to pursue growth strategy as follows; 1) managers can increase their
job security and hostile takeover is less likely to occur; 2) The status, power,
salaries and other forms of compensation increase; 3) The opportunities of
career advancement are created for lower and middle management levels. The
authors suggested a model that can be used to further reduce these potential
conflict issues which incur agency costs, by means of managers facing
disciplinary forces of the manageriallabor market, of product market competition,
of the threat of take over, and a monitoring board of directors.
Jensen (1986), Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stulz (1990) argued that benefit of
debt financing is for controlling overinvestment problems. Adding debt into capital
structure can add value to the firm, especially for cash cow firms which have
substantial cash available. These firms are prone to overinvestment such as to
invest in projects which have negative NPV, through value-destroying diversifying
acquisitions attempts with misguided attempts to maintain market shares at the
expense of profitability and capital providers, Le., equity shareholders and
bondholders. Thus, DIE ratios for mature firm are expected to be high. This is
supported by Stewart et al. (1988) who argued that firm should borrow if it is
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able to, not because it needs to in order to take full advantage of tax benefit of
debt. The less the firm needs to raise capital to finance expansion the more
money it should borrow. In addition, debt commits managers to generate and
disgorge cash which would otherwise be used for unprofitable projects. Thus,
debt in the capital structure served as a control mechanism to motivate
managers to maximize value for investors, to cut back wasteful investment, and
to force the sale of underutilized assets. Two ways to solve an overinvestment
problem are; 1) payout the excess cash by declaring increase in dividend, 2)
through stock repurchase plan. Jensen (1986) found that firms implicitly trade off
the value loss through over-investments against benefits of increased debt and
bankruptcy costs in deciding an optimal capital structure. Harris and Raviv
(1990a) argued that firms which have high debt level with high tangible assets
have less investigation costs, which is important in situation when bankruptcy
occurs. He suggests the capital structure is the trade off between improved
liquidation decisions against investigation costs.
2.3.1.4.2. Potential Conflict between Bondholders and Shareholders.
This type of conflicts occurs when debt has become risky, thus causing the
required rate of return on firm's debt to increase due to the firm taking on a large
new project that is far riskier than it was anticipated by debt-holders. In case this
risky project is successful all the benefits will go to equity shareholders while debt
holders receive only a limited (fixed) gain. However, if the project is unsuccessful,
the bondholders have to share the losses. To protect themselves, from assets
substitution problems, the bondholders and stockholders insist on restrictive
covenants in their lending agreements. These covenants impose restrictions on
the firms' investment decisions and financing policies. In a situation when the firm
has higher debt levels the bondholder will demand higher cost of lending funds.
However, since this covenant cannot protect bondholders from every possible
management decision, the company must be monitored to ensure that the
covenant is obeyed and thus monitoring costs are passed on to stockholders in
the form of higher interest rates. Therefore, the existing shareholders bear the
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cost. Restrictive covenants also act as an incentive to shareholders to invest in
suboptimal projects. The optimal capital structure is the trade off between the
agency costs of too much debt i.e. costs of lost efficiency of management due to
potential of financial distress and bankruptcy plus monitoring costs and the cost
of loss through management investment decision on suboptimal projects with the
benefits of debts. (See,Harris and Raviv (1991 )).
Consistent with this argument, Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer and Thakor
(1989) argued that reputation is an important consideration when managers
make their capital structure decisions. The firm can borrow capital at a relatively
cheaper rate, if investors perceive that the firm has low risks, than a firm with
higher risks. The reason is that investors are not always able to distinguish
between a good performance firm and a relatively poor performance one. They
rely on the company's performance records as a measure of comparing among
competing firms. Therefore it's possible that managers have an incentive to build
their reputation by investing in only a safe project, which not necessarily means
the one that yields higher return to shareholders.
The Agency Costs associated with debt were summarized by Jensen and
Meckling (1984) as follows; 1) the opportunity of wealth loss caused by the
impact of debt on the firm's investment decisions; 2) the monitoring and bonding
expenditure by both bondholders and owner-managers; 3) costs associated with
bankruptcy and reorganization costs. Titman (1984) suggested that agency costs
are an important consideration and should not be limited to the cost associates
with debt or equity capital providers. But the agency costs should be extended to
firms' customers and its employees.
2.3.1.5. Implication of the Trade-Off Theory.
According to the literature review of the Static Trade-Off Theory model above, an
observable pattern of firm's financing behavior can be expected as follows:
i) Firms with more business risk ought to have less debt than lower risk firms, the
greater the risk, the greater the probability of financial distress at any level of
debt. Hence, the greater the expected costs of distress. Thus, firms with lower
21
risk can borrow more before the expected cost of financial distress offsets the tax
advantages of borrowing
ii) Firms that have tangible assets available, such as real estate can use more
debt than firms whose value derives primarily from intangible assets such as
patents and goodwill. The costs of financial distress depend not only on the
probability of incurring distress but also on what happens if distress occurs.
Specialized assets and intangible assets are more likely to lose value if financial
distress occurs than standardized, tangible assets.
iii) Firms that currently pay taxes at the highest rate and are likely to do so in the
future should use more debt than firm with lower tax rates.
2.3.2. The Pecking Order Theory Model
The Pecking Order Theory (POT) provides a contrasting view point
against a target debt to equity ratio. Donaldson (1961) and Myers, (1984) stated
that firms financing behavior according to a preferred hierarchy for financing
decision. The highest preference is to use internal financing i.e., retained
incomes, the effects of depreciation, and capital reserves before resorting to any
form of external funds. Internal funds incur no flotation costs and no additional
disclosure of proprietary financial information that could lead to severe market
discipline and possible loss of competitive advantage. If the external funds are
required firm will prefer the following order; safe debt, convertible securities,
preferred stock and common stock. The motivation for POT financing behavior
are a cheap cost of internal capital, managers retain control of firm, reduced
agency costs of equity i.e., the dilution of shares, and avoid an inevitable
negative market reactions to the announcement on new equity issue( Hawawini
and Viallet, 1999; and Hutchison et al ,1998).
2.3.2.1. The Pecking Order Theory and Information Asymmetry
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) stated that the Pecking Order
hypothesis is based on two key assumptions regarding how managers make
financing decisions. Firstly, because of the existence of Asymmetric Information,
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managers know more about firm's operations, current earnings, growth
opportunities and future prospects than outside investors. The use of internal
funds is considered the cheapest source of funding as it incurs no flotation costs
and fees, and the company is not required to disclose its additional proprietary
financial information that could lead to more severe market discipline and
possible loss of competitive advantage. It also precludes managers from having
to make public disclosure about the firm's investment opportunities and potential
profits that can be realized by investing in them. Secondly, the assumption that
managers will act in the best interest for existing share holders. The manager
may even forego a positive NPV project if it would require issuing new equity,
since this would give much of the project's value to new shareholders at the
expense of the old. They gave the argument that there was no well-defined target
debt-to-equity ratio, because there were two kinds of equity, one at the top of the
Pecking Order that is internal finance, and the other at the bottom which is
equity. Myers summarized the Pecking Order Hypothesis into four parts:
i) Firms are likely to prefer internal finance to external finance when financing
their new investment. The existence of Information Asymmetry has influenced
firms in choosing not to issue new equity. Therefore, the firms have to pass up a
positive NPV investment or the new issue may create disadvantages for the
position of existing shareholders due to the effect of share dilution.
ii) Managers set the target dividend payout ratios based on their future
investment opportunities and expectedl future cash flows. The target payout ratio
is set at the level that causes retained earnings plus depreciation to cover capital
expenditure under normal conditions.
iii) Dividends are "sticky" and firms are reluctant to raise dividends unless they
are confident that the higher dividend +n be maintained. and are reluctant to cut
dividend unless they really have to. If fhe retained earnings are not sufficient for
capital requirements, financial reserve will be depleted whether in the form of
cash or marketable securities. However, if retained earnings exceed the capital
outlays, they will be invested in cash and marketable securities, and then they
will payoff debt obligations.
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iv)The firm's debt-to-equity ratio reflects the accumulated requirement for
external financing. When good investment opportunities are presented with
positive NPV projects, firms that have already depleted their financial reserves
will seek external financing with the following order of preferences: 1) the safest
debt, 2) hybrid securities (convertible bonds) and 3) common equity issuing. As
firms are climb up their pecking order, their level of risk to bankruptcy and
financial distress are increasing. Thus, the potential cost of bankruptcy will
become an important consideration especially when the borrowing capacity is
already exhausted.
2.3.2.2. Pecking Order Theory and Signalling
2.3.2.2.1. Signalling with proportion of debt
Ross (1977) argued that MM (1958)'s irrelevancy proposition was based on the
assumption that the capital market is perfect. Thus, the market "knows" the
(random) return stream of the firm. The firm value is the perceived value of
investor from valuing this stream. Therefore, the change in capital structure may
alter market perceptions. He suggested that in practical world the capital markets
are less perfect. There is a different level of information between insiders and
outsiders. Managers can use higher financial leverage to convey information
about firm value and its future operations, including the quality types of
investment projects. The use of larger levels of debt signals that the firm's
earnings are of a higher quality. Low quality firms are expected to have higher
bankruptcy costs at any debt level, and will not mimic higher quality firms by
issuing more debt. Thus, increasing debt financing conveys positive news
concerning the firm's capacity to service a larger amount of debt (Kim and Stulz,
1988), similarly, decreasing the leverage signals negative news.
Consistent with this Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that managers know more
about the true future value of the firm than anyone else and they act in the best
interest of existing shareholders. Investors have less information and are less
well-informed about the firm's assets value than the current firm insiders.
Therefore, issuing equity is perceived as bad news and sending adverse signals
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to the market, which believes that the firm's shares are over-valued leads to a
corresponding mark down of the firm's security's prices. This is an explanation
for the decline of security prices on the announcement of an equity issue
(Musulis and Kowar, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). This because investors
believe that assets are overvalued by firms issuing equity, which is strongly
supported by evidence of market timing by Graham and Harvey (2001), Banker
and Wurgler(2002), Ritter (2002), Bancel and Mitto(2002), who found that firms
with lower leverage (Iow risk) tend to raise equity when their valuation is high.
Conversely, firms with high leverage (high risk) tend to raise funds when their
valuation is low. Therefore, it is a possibility that equity may be mispriced by the
market when a new investment project requires that a firm has to issue new
equity. The under- pricing of the asset may be so severe that new investors
capture more than the NPV of the new project which results in a net loss to
existing shareholders. Thus, the manager is likely to reject the project even if the
project provides a positive NPV. This situation can be avoided, if the firm
chooses to finance the project by using internal funds or risk-less debt, which are
less severely undervalued by the market. It suggested that firms maintain
financial reserves and the use of cash or debt is preferred to equity.
Fama (1985) argued that positive news of a firm can be observed through the
announcement of bank debt agreements. This is because banks are privy to
inside information and would not approve a loan if negative news comes to light
in the lending process. In contrast, firms that announce bank debt reductions
convey unfavourable inside information.
2.3.2.2.2. Signalling with Proportion of Equity Ownerships
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggested that owners of the firms have more
information about the expected value of the venture projects than outside
investors. This inside information can be transferred to suppliers of capital
because it is in the owners' interest to invest a greater fraction of their wealth in
successful projects. Thus, the willingness of owners to invest in such projects
can serve as a signal of project quality. The firm's value increases with the
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proportion of equity held by owners relative to what they would have held given
low-quality projects. The empirical implications of this signalling argument are
that: 1) if the original founders of a company going public with the decision to
keep a large proportion of securities, then this firm should be expected to have
greater price earning multiples than if founders would have kept only a small
portion of securities which signal a low quality project. 2) If a firm's value is
positively related to the proportion of the owner's wealth held as equity in the
firm, then the firm will have greater debt capacity and will use greater amounts of
debt. Debt is not a signal in this model, but its use will be positively correlated
with the firm's value.
2.3.2.3. Market Reaction to Equity and Debt Issue and Financing Theories
According to the signalling and information asymmetry (Ross, 1977) the firm
choice of capital structure is influenced by the concerns of market reaction to
types of capital issued by the firm. Evidence from various studies found that
found that the market reacts positively to debt issue and negatively to equity.
Furthermore,
Hull (1999) studied the changes of magnitude and direction of stock returns
accompanying pure leverage-change announcements. He found the
announcement period stock returns of firms moving "away from" industry Debt-to-
Equity norms are significantly more negative than returns moving "close to"
theses norms. This is consistent with the Optimal Capital Structure Theory where
the industry Debt-to-Equity norms are a reasonable benchmark of wealth
maximizing leverage ratios. In contrast, Hatfield et al. (1994) carried out research
to test a hypothesis of Masulis (1983), which stated that when a firm issuing debt
is moving toward industry average from below, the market will react more
positively than when the firm is moving away from the industry average. Their
results found that the relationship between a firm debt's levels and that of its
industry did not appear to be of concern to the market.
Otto (2002), studied financing policy and the underinvestment problem for new
business ventures. He found that when a firm's access to internal's generated
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funds is constrained, the firm must enter external capital markets and raise the
required investment in order to capture the value of growth options. Investment
costs and expected volatility of the venture have significant impact on the value
of the firm. Equity financing is preferred when investment costs are low with
expected high volatility. In contrast, when investments are high but volatility is
low, debt capital is preferred. He explained that when growth option is at- the-
money, which is investment cost is about equal to project value, the increase in
volatility of the venture causes a relative large gain in growth value. Firms will
choose equity financing whenever volatility is very high. When the real option is
deep-in-the-money, where investment cost is very low relative to project value,
equity financing is always preferred regardless of the level of volatility. He further
found that when the investment option is near-the-money, the use of debt
financing is preferred if the cost of external funding is low, but if the cost of
external capital is high, equity is preferred. However, Viswanath(1993) and
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) argued that in a multi-period world, the manager of
an undervalued firm may find it optimal to make an equity issue even though
cash is available. This shows that the POT need not always hold. Whenever
managers consider that potential losses of future projects caused by
unpredictable dilution resulting from the issue of risky security to finance such
projects are too great, they may decide to issue a risky security to finance a
current investment even though they may have the option of using cash or
issuing a less risky security Le. debt. Consequently, not all equity
announcements are interpreted by the market as an adverse signal that the firm's
assets are overvalued. Similarly, Thakor (1989) argued that managers of firm
with on-going investment program will recognize that they may have to turn down
worthwhile projects in the future because of information asymmetry at that time.
Consequently, in making financing decisions at the present time, they will have
trade off current dilution against the potential loss of a future NPV>O project.
Thakor's result found that the market reaction to an equity announcement is
sometimes positive and sometime negative, but it is always negative if firm has
sufficient retained earnings to finance the project. Mikkelson and Partch (1986)
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also found the evidence to support Viswanath (1993), who argued that the Myers
and Majluf (1984)'s model is not consistent with all of the empirical observations.
For instance, the model would imply that the price drop for equity issues should
be greater than for convertible debt, and least for straight debt. In practice, this
monotone pattern has not been found. For example, Mikkelson and Parth (1986)
found the price drop on the issue of convertible debt is a negative function of the
quality of the debt, and the less risky a convertible bond issue is, the more the
market will mark down the price of security. Similarly, Eckbo (1986) found no
correlation between the quality of straight debt issue and the market reaction, but
his results could not reject the hypothesis of the market reaction. This finding
leads to the conclusion that the POT does not apply to all instances. Therefore,
in order to explain corporate financing behaviour the extent to which POT holds
needs to be examined.
2.3.3. Empirical Results of Field Research Concerning the Pecking Order
Theory or the Static Trade Off and the Determinants
Pinegar & Wilbrincht (1989) suggested the potential for the case study and small
sample research to yield insights into how corporate make capital structure
decisions beyond those achieved via conventional aggregate analysis and prior
theorizing. A questionnaire survey of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) from
fortune 500 firms in 1986 found that managerial responses are consistent with
the broad predictions of the Pecking Order Theory. So far the sample firms
express a clear preference for internal funding over external funding and for debt
financing rather than share issues. In addition they found that tax and bankruptcy
considerations are not seen as being important by the managers of large U.S.
firms. The results concluded the following: i) managers are more likely to follow
a financing hierarchy than maintain a target debt-to-equity ratio; ii) financing
decisions appear to be more related to the characteristics of the firm's current
investment projects rather than the firm tax and bankruptcy circumstances; iii) the
importance of specific capital structure theories is not related to managerial
perceptions of market efficiency, and therefore, no evidence was found in
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support of signaling argument related to financing decisions; iv) financial planning
principles are more important in governing financing decisions than capital
structure theories; v) capital structure decisions are less binding than either the
investment or the dividend decision. Pinegar and Wilbrincht's results support the
Pecking Order model, but ignore the issue of "asymmetric information" as it
relates to a firm' financing decisions.
Norton (1991) conducted a survey of 98 CFOs from 500 fortune firms on the
topic "the factors affecting capital structure decisions". Analyzing responses he
found that Tax consideration, Market concerns and management's wish for
Flexibility have an important influence on capital structure decisions. Also Agency
costs, Information Asymmetry and Signalling were found to have limited
important in their affects on financing decision choices.
Graham and Harvey (2001) carried out a survey of 392 CFOs about Capital
Structure, Cost of Capital and Capital Budgeting. The authors found that financial
Flexibility and Credit Rating are the main factors concerned when issuing debt.
Also EPS Dilution and recent stock appreciation are matters to be concerned
about when the company decides to issue equity. They found some support for
Pecking Order Hypothesis and Static Trade-off theory. The CFOs responded that
the tax advantage of debt is moderately important for capital structure decisions,
but the tax advantage was the most important for large, regulated and dividend
paying firms. Companies that probably have high corporate tax rates and
therefore large tax incentives to use debt. Most firms have target debt-equity ratio
and issue equity to maintain an optimal target-debt ratio
Alien (1991) conducted a survey on "the determinants of the capital structure of
listed Australian companies: The financial manager's perspective". The results
are consistent with Donaldson's Pecking Order Theory with respect to sources of
financing and the firm's policy of maintaining financial slack. He found that
companies appeared to be trying to maximise corporate wealth as opposed to
shareholders wealth. Managers had learnt to mistrust external sources of
financing as they cannot accurately predict and control market conditions. Thus,
to have sufficient financial reserve is important for a firm's financial planning, so
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that Market Timing, Magnitude and extent of important strategic investment
decisions would remain in their own hands and not be subject to vagaries of
capital market conditions. He found 93 percent of respondents pursued a policy
of maintaining a borrowing capacity. He found that companies tried to maintain
their credit rating and to maintain a moderate level of debt to equity ratios. Firms
regard debt as an automatic extension of internally generated funds. Tax factors
are considered as important but do not override the long term strategic
considerations. He did not find that managers were consciously trade-off the tax
shield benefits against the potential costs of bankruptcy when they were setting
their debt levels.
Fan and So (2000) found that the capital structure decisions of Hong Kong firms
conformed more to the Pecking Order Theory than the Static Trade Off model,
consistent with Pinegar and Wilbrincht (1989).They found some degree of
information asymmetry and firm size having an impact on capital structure
decisions. The Information Asymmetry was perceived to be more serious for
Hong Kong firms than for U.S. firms, but there is no evidence of capital structure
being used as a signal to the market in correcting mis-pricing of outstanding
securities. Managers considered size of the firm as a determinant factor, but
there was no evidence that they considered the proportion of intangible asset to
total assets in making their capital structure decision. In additions, they found that
Signalling was not considered as important for financing decisions.
Linda and Kamal (1992) conducted a survey of over-the-counter (OTC) firms with
regard to the relationship of these firms' Asymmetric Information and their
financing preferences. They found that OTC firms are more likely to experience
Information Asymmetry than the Fortune 500 firms and believe that their
securities are often mispriced. Financial flexibility is highly valued in financing
decisions consistent with the potential detrimental effects of asymmetric
information, as well as financial planning principles. The result support Myers
(1984) argument that information asymmetry provide motivation for pecking order
model of financing.
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Choi (2003) found that the Korean companies' financing behaviour supports the
Target Adjusting model. He implies that every firm has target leverage and
moves toward the target. Consistent with Hovakimian et al. (2003) he found that
firms have target capital structures. Choi's study focuses on firms that issue both
debt and equity, and then draws inferences of firm financing behaviour. He found
that high market to book (proxy of investment opportunities) firms have low target
debt to equity ratios. Profitability has no effect on target leverage. Unprofitable
firms may issue equity to offset the excess leverage due to accumulated losses.
The result lent support to Market Timing, where high stock returns increase the
probability of equity issuance, but Profitability has no effect on target leverage.
The preference toward internal financing and the intention to time the market by
selling new equity when the share price is high interfere with the tendency to
maintain the firm's debt ratio close to the market.
2.3.4. Market Timing and Financing Behaviour
Baker and Wurgler (2002), consistent with Bancel and Miito (2002) and Graham
and Harvey (2001), studied the effects of equity market timing, which is the
practice of a firm issuing securities at high prices and repurchasing at low prices
as the intention to exploit temporary fluctuations in the cost of equity relative to
the cost of other forms of capital. They argued that there is no optimal capital
structure for a particular firm, but instead "the capital structure is the cumulative
outcome of attempts to time the equity market". The market to book ratio was
used to measure the market timing opportunities perceived by managers. The
finding was that low leverage firms are those that raise funds when their market
valuation is high, while high leverage firms are those that raise funds when their
market valuation is low. The fluctuations in the market valuation have large
effects on capital structure that for at least a decade. They concluded that "there
is no optimal capital structure, so market timing financing decisions just
accumulate over time into the capital structure outcome".
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2.4. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS ABOUT THE THEORY
According to the Static Trade- off theory(STOT), an optimal capital structure
exists by trading off costs of firm having high debt Le., costs of Financial Distress
and bankruptcy and Agency costs which are borne by both debt and equity Le.,
direct wealth transfers, assets substitution, and underinvestment against its
benefits. In the firm that follows the STOT the leverage is predicted to be
negatively related to the firm's inherent riskiness through the effect of risk on the
expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress (Myers.1984). It is implicit
that leverage may be positively related to collateral Le. the proportion of firm
assets that are readily saleable, and negatively related to Cash Flow volatility
(Shuetrim et al., 1993)
In Pecking Order Theory (POT), the company has no well defined debt ratio and
the company makes financing decisions based on the relative costs of alternative
methods with Retained Earnings being preferred, followed by Debt and then new
issues of Equity. External fund raising activity is therefore not driven by the target
capital structure, but instead reflects gaps between internal funds and investment
opportunities. The company's financing decision, whether the use of debt or
equity, is optimally based on costs related to each source, the presence of
informational problems between insiders and outsiders as well as divergences
between the market and the intrinsic value of corporate securities (Myers and
Majluf, 1984).
32
CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the results gathered from empirical researches of the
Optimal Capital Structure related to the firm's characteristics. In order to clearly
explain how GKL makes its Capital Structure decision, the GKL's Characteristics
of will be ascertained.
3.2. DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Characteristics of the firm are often used as the determinants of capital structure
by empirical researchers, as firm's characteristics affect the firm's financing
decision. This evidence can be observed through increases or decreases of the
leverage ratios. For example "leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax
shields, investment opportunities, and firm size, decreases with volatility,
advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, profitability and
uniqueness of the product" (Harris and Raviv, 1991). The empirical evidence is
summarized in Appendix 11, and how it influences financing behaviours according
to theoretical models in Appendix Ill.
According the STOT and POT models, how these characteristics influence the
capital structure decision can be explained as follows:
3.2.1. Size
Size is often used as an inverse proxy for probability of bankruptcy and is
considered to be positively correlated to firms' leverage (Rajan and Zingales,
1995). According to the STOT firm with large size is not only less likely to have
lower level of risk as it is more diversified and less susceptible to bankruptcy
than smaller firm (Titman and Wessesl (1988), but also is likely to have less
information asymmetry problems (Myers and Mujluf, 1984). Therefore a large firm
should have more debt in its capital structure as debt has benefits i.e., to lower
the cost of capital which means increased EPS (MM, 1958), increase the firm
value by present value of tax reduction (MM, 1963; Stewart et al., 1988), to signal
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the quality of project to investors and borrowing at cheaper rates (Ross, 1977),
and to control overinvestment problems especially for larger firm in its mature
stage of business cycle (Jensen, 1986). Thus, larger firms are more disposed to
maintain higher level of leverage than small companies. POT predicted that firms
with big size are more likely to maintain a low level of debt and prefer to finance
their operations through internal equity. The motivations are transactions costs
and fees associated with each sources of funds and the management demand
for flexibility and control. Therefore, a large firm will be more likely to maintain a
high level of capital reserves (Myers, 1984) and have a low debt. Nevertheless,
the equity has it costs as large firms tend to face a wealth transfers problem
(Jensen and Meckling, 1984) and overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986)
3.2.2. Profitability
The STOT suggests that firm with profitability have an incentive to finance by
debt rather than equity due to tax benefits (Stewart et ai, 1988) and as an agency
control mechanism (Jensen, 1986). Conversely, the POT suggested that firms
should be financed by Internal Equity and maintains Capital Reserves to take
advantages of future investment opportunity without passing up a positive NPV
project or issuing the equity or external debt at the wrong time due to information
asymmetry problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1984). Thus profitability has
negative relationship with firm debt level (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
In MM (1963), the static Trade Off theory suggests the direction of a positive
relationship between a firm's profitability and its leverage. Stewart et al (1988)
suggested that companies which have surplus cash flows available and are able
to service debt comfortably should borrow as much as possible in order to gain
full benefits of interest tax shield. Furthermore, the more firms need money to
finance their attractive investment opportunities, the less money they should
borrow. This suggests that a firm with high profitability that is able to generate
surplus cash flow should prefer to issue debt to equity. Thus, this implies that
taxes and interest tax shield are an important consideration.
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In contrast, The POT of Donaldson (1961) suggests that the relationship between
leverage and profitability will be negative because the more profitable the firm,
the less need it has to borrow either long-term or short-term. As a result of
transaction costs and associated fees, internal funds are considered as cheaper
than external sources. Therefore, if firms are profitable they don't need to go into
debt. Firms will prefer the use of internal generated funds on retained earnings,
then from debt and finally from issuing new equity. This suggested that
transaction cost is an important consideration and this shows supports to
Pecking Order theory.
Myers and Majluf (1984) drew the same conclusions of how firms make the
financing decision. The Retained earning is preferred as a means of finance,
because there is asymmetric information's problem between debt-holders and
equity-holders. A profitable firm presumably has more internal funds at its
disposal than a less profitable firm. Therefore, the relationship between
profitability and leverage should be negative. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also
found the same result, supporting the Myers' Pecking Order Theory. Even though
profitability is negatively related to the level of gearing, the relationship between
leverage and profitability can be positive. This because although profitable firms
have more access to debt as lenders are also more willing to lend to profitable
firms. However the demand for debt may be negatively related to profits. Thus,
this lends support for POT.
However, Jensen (1986) argues that the relationship between leverage and
profitability depends on the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. If
the market for corporate control is effective, managers of profitable firms are
forced to payout cash by leveraging up. This concern relates to Agency problem.
Because to keep free cash flow available for reinvestment is risky for
reinvestment rate risk. Shareholders as managers may invest in negative NPV
projects and seek growth rather than profitability. On the other hand, if the market
for corporate control is ineffective, managers of profitable firms may choose to
avoid the disciplining role of debt by leveraging down, so that the relationship
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between leverage and profitability can be negative. This is supported by
empirical evidence research of Geyer and Nemec (1994).
According to Jensen (1986), existing shareholders would prefer that the firm
issues new debt rather than equity since the required interest payment on debt
induces the managers to act in the interest of stockholders. With a fixed debt
payment, an inappropriate use of the investors' money could precipitate a default
on debt, bankruptcy proceedings and the possibility that the managers could lose
their jobs. A firm with a high level of cash but having no growth opportunities
available will find it more valuable to return these funds to shareholders rather
than to misguidedly over-invest in core business, to maintain market share, or to
diversify into completely unrelated business that destroy firm's value. Proxy for
Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITDA)
to the book value of assets (TA). (Profitability =EBITDA/ TA)
3.2.3. Taxes
According to STOT, MM (1963) suggested that tax is considered to affect firm's
capital structure decisions as it reduces the bill of tax payments. Tax factor is
found to be very important in deciding on financing decision, especially for large,
regulated and dividend paying firms. This is an incentive for using debt (Graham
and Harvey, 2001; Norton, 1991). Firms which are expected to have a high
marginal tax rate have an incentive to have more debt (Mason, 1990: and
Graham, 1996), but firms with non-debt tax shield is expected to have less debt
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). The incentive of debt financing is diminished as
non debt tax shield increases (Ross, 1985).
According to MM (1963), taxes are an important consideration of firms in
deciding on their optimal capital structure. They suggested that firms should
borrow as much as possible to take advantage from the present value of firms
gained through the tax shield on interest payments. Myers (1984) argued more
debt in the capital structure causes higher firm's risks associated to the possibility
of bankruptcy. Therefore, an excessive uses of debt which aiming to gain the
benefit tax shield maybe a less attractive consideration in formulating capital
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structures. Consistent with this Alien (1991) stated that firms will structure their
venture deals in the most tax-efficient manner, but tax consideration will not
divert them from the broad thrust of their over all strategic policies.
Graham and Harvey (2001) surveyed 392 CFOs; they found that although debt
provides tax bills reduction, firms are concerned about financial flexibility and
credit ratings when issuing debt and concerns about the dilution of share
earnings when issuing equity. Tax consideration is the most important
consideration for large and regulated and dividend paying firms, companies that
probably have high corporate tax rates, thus have incentive to use debt. They
also found that most firms have target debt-to-equity ratio and issue equity to
maintain that ratio. There was some support for both Pecking Order Theory and
Static Trade-Off Theory. Norton (1991) found that managers are considering
Taxes as an important factor for capital structure decision making. This is
consistent with Titi, Sander and Ward (1995) who stated that most managers
highlight Tax consideration in deciding which type of security to issue and
concluded that financial managers strongly support the STOT. Their conclusions
are inconsistent with Harry (1990) and Baskin (1989) who support the POT. In
other views, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) stated that firm with large non-debt
tax shield in form of depreciation, tax credits and tax loss carry forwards(Mason,
1990) are supposed to have lower financial leverage. Tax shield may be
unimportant to such company (Ross, 1985).
3.2.4. Tangibility
Tangibility is measured by use of fixed assets over total assets (FAITA). (See
Bevan and Danbolt,2000). According to the STOT, the firm firm's tangibility is
expected to have a positive relationship with leverage (Rajan and Zingales,
1995). Tangibility of assets represents the effect of collateral value of assets on
the firm's leverage level. For the firm in financial difficulties, tangibility is more
beneficial than intangible assets. It is likely to be positively related to a firm's
leverage as creditors want to assure that loan is backed up by collateral assets.
Therefore, the higher a firm's asset tangibility is, the higher the leverage can be
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(Shuetrim et.a!. 1993). Tangibility is used as collateralization is an important
feature of debt covenants. It is a tool to mitigate agency conflicts of interest
between lenders and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers; 1977). In
addition, tangibility reduces the cost of issuing debts i.e. secured debt, which are
caused by Information Asymmetry problems, thus firms with high tangibility can
borrow at lower rate than firm with less tangibility (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In the
STOT by Harris and Raviv (1990a), the firm with high liquidation value or having
high level of tangibility has low investigation costs, and tends to use more debt
than the firm with low investigation costs. However, Grossman and Hart (1982)
found a negative relationship between leverage and the level of firm's assets.
3.2.5. Growth and Growth Opportunities
Growth is likely to put a strain on retained earnings and to push the firm to
borrow. Thus, it is positively related to leverage. However, investment in growth
opportunities increases the potential for conflict between stakeholders of the firm,
e.g. creditors, managers, debt holders, common stock holders, leading to moral
hazard in the form of asset substitution (Myers, 1977).This could lead to a
negative relationship between Growth and Borrowing. Rajan and Zingales (1995)
and Jong and Dijk (1998) found a negative relationship between growth
opportunities and Debt-to-Equity ratio. This is consistent with Jensen and
Meckling (1976) based on the agency cost theory and Myers (1977) based on
the information asymmetry. The evidence found that both POT and STOT
suggested that firms which in growth mode with growth opportunities available
should have lower level of debt. In order to be able to capture such opportunities
without having to face the risks which are caused by firms not having sufficient
funds i.e., if a firm has to issue more debt this can cause bankruptcy and
management restriction through restrictive covenants from debt holders. If equity
is raised, control is giving away to outsiders and the dilution of the value of
shares. Information costs can make firm with growth opportunities to forgo
positive NPV projects, costs of losing investment opportunities occurs. Sheehan
(2001) argued that the market conditions in 1990s allow firms which are newer,
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smaller and riskier growth options to have great access to equity market and to
use this market as a means to draw large cash reserves. It becomes evident that
firms are more likely to draw the initial funding from the equity market instead of
the internal sources. It explains that capital structure is caused by the market
timing and when growth opportunities present to the firm. Firm may issue equity
or debt even if funds are not needed for investment, but because the market
value of their asset is high. Sheehan's argument is consistent with Ritter (2002);
Graham and Harvey (2001); Banker and Wurgler (2002). The proxy to measure
growth opportunity is the ratios of market of the firm to book value of assets.
3.2.6. Business Risks
Firm risk is the combination of business risk and financial risk.
Business risk is the uncertainty of income caused by the firm's industry and due
to the variability of sales caused by its products, customers, and the way it
produces its products. Business risk is measured by the variability of firm's
operating income over time caused by both its sales variability and operating
leverage. Operating leverage is a measure of business risk. A firm has high
fixed costs of production makes the operating earnings series more volatile,
relative to the sales series. Firms with a high operating leverage are more risky
and sensitive to changes of economic environments through their business life
cycle than firms with lower fixed costs components. The greater the business risk
faced by the firm, the lower the debt level should be (see, DeAngelo and Masulis,
1980). Volatility of earnings is a measure of firm business risk. The volatility gives
investors little chance in accurately forecasting the future earnings from available
information. Investors or shareholders perceive the riskiness of the investment
increases from this volatility. Therefore they would demand a higher premium to
compensate for that risk from their investments. This leads to a higher cost of
debt.
Financial risk is the additional uncertainty of returns to equity holders due to a
firm's use of fixed obligation debt securities. Financial risk is indicated by debt to
equity ratios. Although, increasing debt will increase returns on shareholders in
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good time, it also can create debt burden in time of economic downturn. The
ability of firm to take on financial risk depends on its business risk. If the firm has
lower business risk, investors are willing to accept higher financial risk (see, Ross
et ai, 1996). The "static trade-off' hypothesis, "pecking-order" hypothesis,
agency costs related theories and product market interaction consideration all
predict the negative relationship between leverage and earnings volatility. That is
the higher the volatility of earning the lower the level of indebtedness of the
company.
3.2.7. Financial Slack and Management Flexibility
Financial slack means having cash or near cash and/or spare debt capacity. It is
valuable for firm to carry out its strategic plan successfully. Firms that have high
debt level have low flexibility, and may not be able to respond to opportunities as
they appear in the business. Firms may restrict debt level below that of the
optimal level in order that the risk of missing profitable investment opportunities is
reduced. Evidence from the studies of Graham and Harvey (1999); Norton
(1991); Alien (1991); Bancel and Mitto (2002), and Gapenski (1997) found that
managers considered financial flexibility as a very important factor in deciding the
Capital Structure as well as the Credit rating and market conditions and
corporate planning principles and EPS dilution.
Financial flexibility is usually referred to as the amount of cash that firms build up
over time. It can be viewed as negative debt. If there is no effective market for
corporate control, management would prefer to retain excess amount of cash
(Opler et al. 1999). Graham and Harvey (1999) surveyed 392 CFOs in order to
ascertain the relationship of theory and practice of corporate finance behaviour.
They found that large firms are concerned about maintaining financial flexibility
and a good credit rating when making decisions to issue debt, and earning per
share dilution and recent price appreciation when issuing common equity. The
results support both POT and the STOT but show only little regard for the
concern about Asymmetric Information, Transaction Costs, Free Cash Flows and
Personal Taxes.
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Bancel and Mitto (2002) surveyed managers of 16 European countries. Evidence
showed that Financial Flexibility and the Earning per Share (EPS) dilution are the
most important determinants of capital structure decisions, which was similar to
U.S.A. firms. The evidence shows only modest support for STOT and weak
support for the POT and Agency Costs theory framework. Managers show
concern about Financial Flexibility in making Capital Structure decisions as the
factor provides a key for them to have access to external financing in whatever
economic circumstances. Furthermore, there is concern about EPS dilution when
considering Common Stock issues. Therefore, a Convertible Debt issue is
considered as a major advantage. This is consistent with the POT, which
suggests the relationship between leverage and flexibility should be negative. If
POT was followed, companies should wish to maintain spare borrowing capacity.
This prevents firms having to make equity issues when they would prefer to avoid
this method of financing for particular projects. Companies would also have a
clear set of preferences towards availability of funding sources, which is
supported by Alien (1991 ).Brigham and Gapenski (1997) also found that because
of an Asymmetric of Information firms should have borrowing capacity reserve in
order to be able to take advantage of good investment opportunities without have
to issue stock at low price, hence the leverage ratio will generally be lower than
suggested by the STOT Model. The proxy for the financial flexibility is the ratio of
cash and marketable securities over current assets.
3.2.8. Management Values and Corporate Strategy
Whitley (1992) stated that developing economy firms follow corporate structure
that is similar to those of conglomerates. This suggests that the issue of the
relationship between a firm's strategy and its capital structure has special
relevance to any study examining the financing behaviour of firms in a
developing economy. The formal testing of the impact of corporate strategy on
the firm's capital structure was started by Barton and Gordon (1988). They stated
that strategy is a proxy of management values, goals and motivation for
diversification. Thus, it must therefore include managers' preference for Debt and
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Equity. Jordan et al. (1998) also found that competitive strategy influences capital
structure. The company characteristics (as above) related to its operating
environment in both micro and macro levels are also having great impact on its
current capital structure decision.
3.3. CONCLUSION
This chapter showed the theoretical model of how firms approach their Optimal
Capital Structure. Two theoretical models of capital structure were outlined. The
STOT is useful for explaining corporate debt levels, while the POT explains
Capital Structure changes. The empirical factors influencing decisions as they
were ascertained from previous researches were identified. It is evident from the
literature that it is important for firms to have the appropriate Capital Structure in
order to maximize their shareholders' value at the most competitive costs as
possible. (Appendix 11, Ill)
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY· GRACE, KENNEDY LIMITED (GKL)
The purpose of this chapter is to present Grace, Kennedy Limited and its Capital
Structure. The company position in the market place and its performance will be
established through information available from financial statements. This
information will then be incorporated in company strategic plan and economic
environments to derive the basis for evaluation of GKL's Capital Structure in the
next chapter.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Grace Kennedy Limited (GKL) is one of Jamaica's largest publicly held
conglomerates, with six divisions and approximately 62 subsidiaries and
associated companies, spanning the sectors of Finance, Maritime, Food trading,
Remittances, Retail and Trading. GKL operates in Jamaica, the wider Caribbean,
Latin America, Canada, and New York and in Miami (Appendix IV). GKL's long
history started in February 14, 1922. It has an excellent reputation with a strong
customers' base, and it possesses strong brand equity. GKL is perceived as a
low risk firm as it owns well diversified business units coupled with a dynamic
team of management with strong expertise and great vision. GKL is classified as
a mature firm, and it has reached the edge of mature stage in the business life
cycle. Thus, it chooses to diversify into several business industries locally and
internationally. This allows the Company to create synergies and values to its
shareholders and customers. Thus, GKL has enjoyed continuous growth in spite
of some uncertainties arising from its operating environment from time to time.
GKL has become the only conglomerate listed in all three Caribbean Stock
Exchanges. As regards GKL' strategic plan, current company's strategies is part
of carrying out the so called "2020 Vision", ( see appendix V), developed in 1995
as the company aims to gear itself to meet the challenges of the future. It has
pursued rapid growth strategy by expanding through acquisitions and
diversification in both local and international markets. The vision sets out the path
which the company will follow to increase training of its staff and to employ state-
of-the-art technology as tools to achieve increased productivity and maintain the
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high quality of its goods and services. Since the programme has begun the
company's net earning has been recorded at 120 percent increase in the last five
years.
4.2. GRACE, KENNEDY L1MITTED AND FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS
4.2.1 Macro Economy
During the decade of the 1990s, the performance of the Jamaican economy was
rather poor according to macroeconomic indicators, characterized by negative or
very low economic growth. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate
during 1997-2002 ranged from minus 1.50 to 1.10 percent. GDP per Capita
Growth Rate was between minus 2.20 to 0.61. There were also high levels of
unemployment during the same period within range of 15 percent to 16.50
percent of the labour force. The inflation rate has recently been brought under
control at an average annual rate of 8.6 percent after reaching 80 percent in
1991. This results in a declining percentage of persons below the national
poverty line from 44.6 percent in 1991, down to 15.9 percent in 1998, but
increased to 16.7 percent in 2001. Jamaican's external debt services ratio was
over 15 percent for the decade. Trade balance deficit grew over the period. The
value of export goods fell during 1995 to 1999, while visitor expenditure grew at a
slow rate. The government struggled to keep the fiscal deficit under 8 percent of
GDP. In 2001 and 2002, the Jamaican economy was hit by a number of political
and economic shocks. A high crime rate followed by the September 2001 terror
attacks in the United Stated hurt the tourism industry. Then severe tropical
storms caused flood damage to infra structure and crops in November 2001 and
May 2002. The fiscal deficit expanded during 2001 to more than 6.5 percent of
GDP, up from 6.0 percent in 2000. Government's external debt remains high at a
rate of 103 percent. This contributes to a continuously high interest rate, the
highest interest rate compared to Trinidad, Tobago and Guyana, in the same
region (see appendix VI). Foreign competition has increased and businesses in
general have weak financial conditions accompanied by a significant depreciation
of the Jamaican dollar. Overall although Jamaica has made measurable progress
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in stabilizing the economy since suffering from the financial crisis in mid-1990s,
the economy has not yet returned to a path of sustained growth. The Jamaican
country risk forecasts for the period 2002 to 2004 are as follows:
Short-term Risk Events-Investors aversion to the more highly indebted Latin
American and Caribbean markets could lead to greater scrutiny of Jamaica's
poor economic fundamentals in 2003, restricting the sovereign's access to
international capital markets, and placing increasing pressure on the Jamaican
dollar.
Political Risk-Following the sharp decrease in its parliamentary majority in the
October 2002 general election, from 38 seats to just eight in the 50-seat
parliament, the People's National Party (PNP) may find governing ability more
difficult in the forecast period. In light of the necessity for an austere budget in
2003/04, the government also faces an increased likelihood of social unrest in
2003/2004.
Economic Outlook-In 2003-04 GDP growth will remain modest, given the
government's lack of room for maneuver to boost domestic spending and
investment, along with continued sluggish economic activity in the US, Jamaica's
main trading partner.
Debt Outlook-A significant risk exists that the sovereign will be unable to tap the
international capital markets in 2003, necessitating an increase in official
assistance. (http://www.boLjm.com)
4.2.2. Industry Analysis
4.2.2.1. Characteristics of Caribbean's Conglomerate Industry
The firms throughout the region are in growth mode as they are characterized by
almost annual acquisition or new strategic relationships to their already well-
diversified business portfolio. Each company continues to grow from strength to
strength as they reap the benefits of diversification. However, the challenges for
firms in this segment are different from other industries. The top priority of these
firms is cost control and the challenge of finding the right candidates for new
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relationships. The right fit that would provide firms with synergistic benefits and
firm dynamic is becoming harder to find. The two conglomerate firms that have
dominated this market are the Neal Massy Holdings (NMH) generating the
largest revenue of approximately US$395 Million followed closely by Ansa MeAl
(AMA) with US $341 million. Even though NMH has grater revenue than AMA,
the latter earned US$46 million of profit before tax compared to NMH of US$35
million. Nevertheless, both of the firms have performed significantly above
Industry averages.
The optimal use of resources is becoming the most important key success factor
for firm's growth due to the increase in firms' size and portfolio mix of industries
that may hamper firm's growth. A challenge of firms especially with different
operations is to find the common goals and strategic plans to achieve them
together in the most advantageous way. The industry's efficiency ratio as
indicated by Return on Capital employed (RaC) was low at 1.4 percent. The
portfolio mix held by the conglomerate has great impact on this ratio. Capital
intensive and financial institutions tend to have low RaC. In contrast, distribution
and service industries tend to have higher RaC. Industry average Return on
Equity is 11.4 percent. The AMA has a highest ROE of 18.1 percent which
followed by NMH of 16.1 percent, and Grace, Kennedy Limited (GKL) of 15.7
percent. The companies in this industry and their relative performance are:
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The variance in performance between the three top companies was very narrow
with Ansa MeAl just marginally outperforming Neal & Massy Holdings Limited. In
this category, the top two positions went to T&T companies followed by Barbados
and then Jamaica.
4.2.2.2. GKL and Industry 'Five Forces' Analysis
An industry analysis provides information regarding the industry driving force and
the attractiveness of Conglomerate industry. It gives the key to management on
how to plan its strategy to capture the opportunities, to neutralise or even reduce
the threats for the firm and its operating environment. It also enables the firm to
effectively allocate resources to achieve the company's goals.
Barriers to Entry
~ Low in goods sectors of manufacturing and trading but high in the
services sector
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~ Players can gain access to the sector via relatively cheap and available
imports
~ Large capital requirements and increased regulation makes financial
services industry difficult to enter
Power of Suppliers
~ In the services industry the principal supplier is labor. A tightening job
market and increased number of qualified people seeking employment
has reduced the power of labor
Power of Customers
~ As players in services industry expand and fight for greater market share
customers will have more power
Risk of Substitutes
~ Goods sector rife with a variety of imported substitutes
~ Financial services sector is still recovering from collapse.
~ Industry is dominated by few powerful players. As the population becomes
more aware/educated about choices, providers of services have to
improve offerings to keep market share
Industry Rivalry
~ Intense rivalry exists in the goods sector between local manufacturers and
imports
~ Due to Large capital requirements and increased regulation in financial
services industry. Thus, it has very little competition.
~ Rivalry also, exists in the remittance sector, which has seen a boom in
past years - Grace, Kennedy Limited was the innovator in this sector, but
in recent times many have jumped on the band wagon, moving into
strategic areas of the US to cash in on the highly populated Caribbean
areas.
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~ Increased rivalry is experienced in the retail area (Hi-Lo Stores), where
other chains are benefiting from the assumption that they are cheaper and
in key areas that Hi-Lo is has yet to enter.
4.2.2.3. GKL and Critical Success Factors
~ With respect to the Retail & Trading Division, in order to remain profitable
and to get market share, this division needs to invest more in new stores
(Hi-Lo and Rapid) in order to have a presence in the market place. The
continued return to profitability at Medi-Grace, especially in getting back or
finding new principals should be a point of interest over the next year.
~ The Food Trading Division's profitability hinges on its continued
innovations in new products and product lines while maintaining current
principals. In order to increase market share, the division will need to
invest in upgrades and creation of new factories and equipment to be
competitive both locally and internationally.
~ The future of the Financial Division sustainability and profitability is largely
dependent on future acquisitions and mergers, as well as the creation of
an island-wide network - creating greater access to all areas of the
population. Currently, the Financial Services Division is concentrated in
the corporate area, which limits it from benefiting from other income
generating areas like Mandeville - with a high concentration of returning
residents with foreign currency to invest.
~ Maritime will take still some time to return to the level of profitability, but in
the meantime, its continued investment in new equipment and facility
upgrade (http://www.firstglobalstockbrockers.com/grace.htm)
4.2.3. SWOT Analysis and Grace, Kennedy Limited
The SWOT analysis provides information regarding the firm's position in its
environment. It serves as a step to identify firm internal strengths and
weaknesses and includes the external opportunities and threats that the firm
encounters. It is an important tool for a firm to generate its strategic plan.
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4.2.3.1. GKL: External Analysis
Opportunities
~ Expansion into services where the barriers entry are considerably higher
than the manufacturing and trading sector
~ International expansion
~ Expansion through acquisitions
~ Synergies between Grace, Kennedy Limited businesses
Threats
~ Global competition
~ Instability in local economy and political arena
~ Stringent import regulations of foreign countries which hurt Grace Export
sales
4.2.3.2: GKL: Internal Analysis
Strengths
~ Proactive and focused management team
~ Diversified operations- profits generated from five core divisions which
helps reduce earnings volatility
~ Continued introduction of new products
~ Openness of company and track record of honesty allows it to enjoy great
customer loyalty and goodwill
~ Continued investment in technology to reduce costs and increase
efficiencies
~ Expansion into international markets to reduce group profit dependence
on local economy
~ Strong consumer and customer base
~ Wide base of principals
n96'60u ; " I i
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Weaknesses
~ Approximately 70% of profits are dependent on the local economy and
movements in GDP
~ Slow to implement change
~ High cost of operations
~ Short term focus
4.2.3.3. GKL and Current Strategy to the Year 2005
1) Moving closer to the final consumer
2) Expand faster in services
3) To grow international businesses to earn at least 50% of profits from
economies outside Jamaica
4) Invest in our people
(http://www.firstglobalstockbrockers.com/grace.htm)
4.3. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND GRACE, KENNEDY LIMITED
To understand the financing behavior of the firm according to STOT and POT
models, and how GKL determines the Capital Structure, it is necessary to know
the level of Capital Investment and sources of funds available to GKL, and what
sources of funds have been used during this period. These factors have great
influences on the manager's decisions.
4.3.1. GKL and Capital Expenditure
2002-1998
In 1998, JM$ 277 million was spent on fixed asset additions. The company
invested in modernized its tools and operations. It invested heavily on upgrading
information technology within the group. This is in line with its group's strategic
plan "GKL20/20 VISION" (see appendix V). The capital investment had increased
in 1999, up to JM$ 477 million. Similar to other years during this specific period,
the company made heavily investments to improve efficiency, and laid
foundations for the coming years as it was aiming to achieve rapid growth and
51
profitability. New plants and new business unit expansions had increased. In
2000, the capital investment had declined to the same level as of 1998, JM$ 277
million, and rose up to JM$ 586 million in 2001. In 2002 the amount of JM$ 540
million had been invested on major capital expenditure items include the
upgrading of factories, particularly at Grace Food Processors (canning) Limited
where the Capri-Sun juice line was installed at cost of $53million and upgrading
the information technology at Grace, Kennedy Remittance Services where $99
million was spent. The group continues to make capital investments in high
growth sectors that will maximize returns. In the year 2003, it expected to have
higher capital investment then the previous year (See table 4.1 ).
Table: 4.1 GKL and Capital Investments during the Year 1998-2002
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
CAPEX 277,000 477,000 277,000 586,000 540,000
Source: obtained from annual report 2002: page 29
4.3.2. Investment Criteria
The GKL group operates on the basis that cash generation is the most important
measure in driving shareholders' value. It set a target on revenue growth rate of
10 percent per annum with a return on equity of 20 percent. The new businesses
investment decisions will be evaluated according to these criteria. It has a 15
percent overall Weighted-Average-Cost of Capital (WACC) which is used as a
hurdle rate. The strategically fit and synergy effects from new business to
existing business is important for GKL's expansion through mergers and
acquisitions. The financing decision is in line with the GKL's corporate strategic
planning (Financial Director's Report: http://www.gracekennedy.com/head.htm)
4.3.3. Capital Structure and Leverage ratios
The GKL group's Capital Structure has been a combination of debt and equity at
an average level of debt to equity of 31.2 percent. The hurdle rate as mentioned
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above is at the level of 15 percent with the cost of equity 20 percent. The after
tax cost of debt is approximately 12.6 percent. This DebUEquity ratio is close to
Neal and Massy Limited (NML), which operate in the same industry with a similar
combination of business units. (See Table 4.14). GKL's leverage ratio has a
declining trend from 1999 to 2002. A leverage ratio of 30.68 percent in 1998 had
increased by 24.2 percent in 1999, up to 38.12 percent. The leverage had
reduced by 15.8 percent down to 32.10 percent in 2000. After a slight increase in
2001 by of 3.60 percent, it declined further in 2002 of 22.84 percent further down
from 33.27 percent to 25.67 percent in 2002. This indicated that GKL has
borrowing capacity available by comparing this ratio with NML of the same year.
During the interview with the Financial Manager, Mr.Messado, he indicated that
this ratio is likely to increase in the year 2003 as GKL plans to pursue further
growth opportunities in international markets.
4.3.4. Sources of Funds
It is important to ascertain each source of fund which has been employed by
GKL during this period.
4.3.4.1. Debt
Most funds are obtained from overseas Le. the United States, Trinidad, and
Tobago as they offer lower interest rates accompanied by a more stable
economy environment. Secured and Unsecured bank loans, Mortgage loans, and
financial leases have been sources for long-term debt. Unsecured loans are
normally a larger portion than Secured loans and are supported by promissory
notes or letters of comfort from the parent company. Interest rates of these loans
range between 6.75 percent to 32 percent in 1999, between 6.83 to 25 percent in
2000, and between 13 percent to 29 percent of the year 2001 and 2002. The
range between 1.9 percent and 2.4 percent of total financing capital was minority
interest. GKL does not favor making debt issues unless it has major expansion
with addition of the right market conditions. It maintains a conservative principle
as to employ as little debt as possible. Short term Bank loans are favorable to
53
GKL. It has an abundance of credit lines available for the firm which
accommodates the nature of GKL's operations as traders and distributors
worldwide. This advantageous source allows the firm to have a very low level of
long term liabilities compared to its total shareholders' funds available. These
credit lines have been backed up by the company borrowing capacity which
indicated by company capital reserves, cash and cash equivalents. (Appendix
VII).
4.3.4.2. Shareholders' Equity
During 1998 to 2002 the number of shares issued increased from 180,491,000
shares up to 323,075,000 shares at a value of JM$ 1 per share. The aim of
issuing these shares was firstly, part of Executive Share Option Scheme and
secondly, to provide bonus to shareholders. GKL has not raised funds by using
this method as the company has enough funds from other sources. Management
sees this vehicle of raising funds as too costly and inconvenient. Furthermore,
the capital market in Jamaica is too volatile and too risky for such method. It had
planned to go public in 2000 at the NASDAQ stock exchange. The United States
markets were focused on technology, telecommunication and media stocks at
that time. The GKL has delayed this venture and is waiting to find the right
market conditions to enter this stock exchange. (Appendix VIII).
4.3.4.3. Capital Reserves
GKL has a high level of Capital Reserve accumulated from its continuous
successful performance over previous years. Capital Reserve has increased
substantially from JM$ 2.1 billion in 1998 up to JM$ 4.2 billion at the present. The
Capital Reserves comprised of:
Transfer from Profit and Loss account.
Share Premium
Realized gains on disposal of assets
Capital distributions received
Par value of bonus issued
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Profit capitalized by group companies
Unrealized surplus on the revaluation of fixed assets
Goodwill arising on consolidation of fixed assets
Other (Appendix IX)
4.3.4.4. Cash
Cash has been the main preferential source of funding of GKL. It operates on the
basis of cash generation. Cash has been used as an important measure in
driving shareholders' value. The GKL's cash and short- term investments have
increased from JM$ 2.3 billion in 1998 up to JM$ 11.2 billion in 2002, Included in
this amount are cash at bank and cash in hand, short term deposits and short
term investments. The weighted average effective interest rate on short term
deposits was 18 percent in 2002. These deposits have an average maturity of
less than 90 days. Cash from operating activities also increases results of total
Net Cash Position or Free Cash Flow ( cash and short-term investments less
total gearing, deposit payable and securities sold under agreement to
repurchase) increase from JM$ 1.1 billion in 1998 up to JM$ 2.4 billion for the
year 2002.( see appendix X)
4.3.4.5. Earnings vs. Dividends
GKL has succeeded in steadily increasing its earnings and dividends. It retains a
large portion of about 88 percent plowback into the business by maintaining its
dividend policy at 11.75 percent after tax profits. GKL's dividends have increased
from JM$ 56.4 million in 1998 up to JM$ 166.6 million in 2002. In the year 2002
Divided per Share has increased by 43.30 percent and earnings is also
increased by approximately of 41 percent. The average EPS growth during this
period is 23.52 percent, while an average DPS is at 15.45 percent. (Table 4.2)
Table: 4.2. GKL and Earnings and Dividends during the period 1998-2002
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
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No.of shares issued 180,491 180,491 216,588 266,887 323,075
Dividend pay-out 56,395 81,221 90,246 116,260 166,605
Dividend per share (cents) 31 45 42 44 52
% increase over prior year 0.70% 44% 11.10% 28.80% 43.30%
Earnings 505,790 587,010 721,519 1,010,320 1,419,243
EPS 2.83 2.25 2.7 3.13 4.39
% increase over prior year 13.30% 16.10% 22.90% 40.00% 40.48%
g- in dividends (Average) 15.45%
g- in earnings (Average) 23.52%
Source: obtained from annual report 1998-2002
4.3.4.6. Retained Earnings
The GKL has been an outstanding performer with a high rate of growth. Also
Profitability has increased over the years. GKL retained the amount of JM$ 1.6
billion in 1998, which has is increased up to JM$ 3.3 billion in 2002. (See Table
4.3)
Table: 4.3. GKL and accumulated Retained Earning during the period 1998-2002
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ 'ODD 'ODD 'ODD 'ODD 'ODD
Retained 1,660,996 1,961,119 2,263,654 2,712,458 3,263,261
Earnings
Source: obtained from annual report 1998-2002
4.4. GKL AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS
4.4.1. Company size
Company size is indicated by its market capitalization value (or market cap) and
sales. Market capitalization is the number of a firm's shares held by the public
times current stock price. Thus the market capitalization of a given company
changes as its stock price changes. According to its market capitalization, the
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GKL is the largest firm in Jamaica compared to its peers in the same industry.
GKL market capitalization is illustrated in the table 4.4 and 4.5 below:
Table: 4.4 GKL and Market Capitalization
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
No. of shares issued 180,491 180,491 216,588 266,887 323,075
Market Price per Share 20.39 23.5 17.95 19.4 38
shareholders 'equity per Unit(BV) 22 25 24.95 24.11 24.24
Market capitalisation 3,682,016 4,241,539, 3,887,755 5,177,608 *8,875,390
Market cap, average *4,499,390
Value at July 12, 2002
Source: adapted from http://www.firstglobalstockbrockers.com/grace.htm
Table: 4.5 GKL and Sales
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Turnover 13,543,858 14,063,653 14,103,951 15,442,090 18,309,534
% increase over the period 2.2% 3.8% 0.3% 9.5% 18.6%
Source: Annual Report and Account 2002: page 9
The GKL's size had slightly increased during the period of 1998 to 2001. During
the year 2001 to 2002 the company sales has greatly increased by 18.6 percent.
Market capitalization had moved up from JM$ 5.2 billion to JM$ 8.9 billion in the
year 2002. The group average of capitalization is JM$ 4.5 billion. Thus GKL is
one of the largest company in Jamaica compared to its peer groups i.e., Jam
Producer, Lascelles, and Pan Jam, which have a market capitalization in 2002
of JM$ 1.6 billion, JM$ 5.3 billion and JM$ 2.3 billion respectively. The company
is likely to further increase in size.
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4.4.2. Profitability
GKL has been very profitable in spite of Jamaican economic contraction. A well
diversified range of businesses have contributed to group profitability. In 2002,
Financial and Services sector was the best performer contributing highest profit
in the group followed by Information sector, Food Trading, Retail and Trading,
and Maritime, respectively. Total profit of the group has increased from JM$ 696
million in 2001 up to JM$ 1.75 million in 2002. In 1998, GKL's Group's revenues
increased by 5.7 percent to $14.5 billion. Trading profit increased substantially by
33.3% to $765.9 million. The Net Profit Attributable to Stockholders increased by
JM$ 59.3 million over the corresponding period of 1998, moving from $446.5
million to $505.8 million, an increase of 13.3 percent. In 1999, sales revenues
reached $14.06 billion (1998: $13.54 billion), an increase of 3.84 percent or
$519.7 million over the previous year (US$1 =J$42). The Net Profit Attributable
to Stockholders increased by $81.2 million over the period, moving from $505.9
million up to $587.0 million, an increase of 16.1 percent. In 2000, GKL achieved
sales revenues of $14.10 billion (1999: $14.06 billion), an increase of 2.84
percent. The Net Profit Attributable to Stockholders increased by $134.5 million
over the corresponding period, moving from $587 million to $721.5 million, an
increase of 22.9 percent. Sales revenues of 2001 had increased by 9.5 percent
from previous year. The revenues from sales of $15.4 billion (2000: $14.1
billion).The Net Profit Attributable to Stockholders increased by $288.8 million. In
2002, GKL reported revenues of $ 18.3 billion with an increase of $2.9 billion,
which accounted for 18.6 percent increase from previous year. The Net profit
attributable to shareholders rose to $ 1.42 billion (2001: $1.01 bn), increased by
$408.9 million or 40.5 percent (Appendix XI, a). Table 4.6 shows the profitability
ratios of GKL during the years 1998 to 2002, these ratios have an increasing
trends and it is likely to continue generate profit to shareholders. Appendix XI, b
illustrates the profits which are generated from different sectors during the period
year 1998 to 2002.
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Table: 4.6. GKL and Profitability ratios during the year 1998 to 2002
Profitability analysis 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Margin before interest and tax 2.6% 1.8 % 2.6% 4.9% 5.4%
Net profit margin 3.73% 4.17% 5.12% 6.54% 7.75%
Return on assets 5.8% 5.8% 6.5% 6.6% 6.5%
Return on total equity 13.40% 13.8 % 14.5% 17.1% 19.9%
Financial leverage effect 1.47% 2.36% 1.91% 1.33% 1.43%
Source: adapted from annual report 1998-2002
GKL's performance has been recorded as seen in Appendix IV, b the Food
Trading, Financial Services and Information Divisions have also increased
profitability over this period, while Retail and Trading and the Maritime Divisions
both recorded reductions in profits in comparison to the previous year. The
Financial, Information and Food Trading Divisions are set to be the new profit
centres for the group. The Information Division has an increase in competition in
terms of remittances leading to reduction of margins in order to remain
competitive.
4.4.3. Taxes
Similar to Kester and Chang (1994) the proxy used here for tax rate is the ratio of
taxes paid to pre-tax income. Proxy for Non-Debt Tax Shield is the ratio of
depreciation, investment tax credits, and Tax-Loss Carry Forwards to Total
Assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Jamaica's corporate tax is 33.3 percent.
The effective tax rate of GKL for the year as follows: (see table 4.7)
Table 4.7 GKL and Taxes
effective Tax Tax loss Total
Year tax rate Shields Depreciation Tax credit carry f/w Total Assets Results
1998 20.20% 146,979 172,477 31,772 234,604 438,853 8,674,688 5.10%
1999 21.90% 142,803 208,676 37,483 187,403 433,562 9,999,799 4.30%
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2000 25.30% 144,705 234,164 53,649 396,558 684,371 1,115,666 6.10%
2001 20.10% 210,014 288,611 56,872 324,517 670,000 15,383,085 4.30%
2002 16.90% 353,429 361,367 59,874 205,968 627,209 21,962,185 2.80%
Sources: calculated from Annual report 1998-2002
4.4.4. Tangibility
Tangibility of GKL is measured by the ratio of book value of depreciated fixed
assets to total assets. Table 4.8 illustrates the tangibility of GKL. The company
has very low levels of fixed assets total assets, on average 13.94 percent. The
consolidated balance sheets for the group have not recorded its assets under-
management, which are not beneficially owned by the group, but which the
banking subsidiaries manage on behalf of investors. Book value of these assets
amounted to JM$ 3.5 billion, JM$ 6.3 billion, JM$ 9.6 billion and JM$ 11.4 billion,
from 1999 to 2002 respectively.
Table: 4.8 GKL and Tangible Assets
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Fixed assets 1,413,378 1,599,823 1,741,054 1,947,667 2,076,970
total assets 8,674,688 9,999,799 11,156,660 15,383,085 21,962,185
Net F/A ratios 16% 16% 15.6% 12.6% 9.5%
Sources: Adapted from Annual report 1998-2002
4.4.5. Growth
The analysis of ratios (table 4.9) indicates that GKL has an increasing trend of
growth. It has retained 88 percent of the earnings within business. The
company's ROE has increased from 13.4 percent in 1998 up to 19.9 percent in
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2002. The Return on Total Capital has increased during the period year of 1999
to 2002 by 40 percent.
According to g = ROE x Retention ratio, the company growth rate during this
period is at average of 13.85 percent. The company had increased its assets
substantially in 2001. Increasing assets are good indicator of the company's
future operations. During this period the company has planned to improve its
efficiency and has made various acquisitions. During the period of year 1999 to
2000, the company has divested unprofitable businesses on order to increase
efficiency, and released cash to be invested in more profitable businesses. The
growth of company-owned brands world-wide continued to encouraging sales in
international market. Remittance services Ltd, which operates in Caricom
continues to show substantial growth both in terms of turnover and profitability.
PIE ratios of GKL moved up closer to being similar with other companies of
the same industry Le. in 2002, GKL has moved from 5.12 to 8.65 times, while
Lascelles moved from 4 .55 to 8.00 times. Pan Jam moved from 7.12 to 8.50
times. Overall, GKL is trended to be continued in growth aspect.
Table: 4.9. GKL and Growth Aspects
Growth Analysis 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Retention rate 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Return on total capital 25% 23.30% 27.70% 35.0%
\
Return on Equity (ROE) 13.40 13.8 14.5 17.1 19.9
Total asset turnover (TAT) times nlav 2.33 2.09 1.75 1.36
Total asset/equity 1.41 1.43 1.3 2.55 1.36
Net Profit Margin 3.73 4.17 5.12 6.54 7.75
Sustainable growth rate 1 13.85
PIE ratios 7.28 10.68 5.39 5.12 8.65
PIE of market average 5.91 8.8 7.48 9.36 9.32
Sources: Adapted from Annual report 1998-2002
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4.4.6. Growth Opportunities
Similar to Bevan and Danbolt (2000), Market to book ratio is a good proxy for
growth opportunities for GKL. It is common with most studies which tend to apply
proxies, rather than valuation models to estimate growth opportunities (Danbolt
et aI.1999). From table 4.10 shows that GKL's Market-to-Book Value has been
low during the period 1998-2001, and it has improved greatly in 2002.
Considering all aspects, it is likely to further increase in the future. The higher the
MV/BV ratios indicate the higher growth opportunities.
Table: 4.10. GKL and Market to Book Value
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ 'ODD '000 '000 '000 '000
Market to book ratios 0.92 0.94 0.72 0.8 1.57
No. of shares issued 180,491 180,491 216,588 266,887 323,075
Market Capitalisation MV 3,682,016 4,241,539 3,887,755 5,177,608 12,276,900
Shareholders' equity BV 3,982,797 4,517,598 5,404,775 6,433,887 7,832,863
Market Price Per Share (MV) 20.39 23.5 17.95 19.4 38
Book value per share ( BV) 22.1 25 24.9 24.1 24.24
Sources: calculated from Annual report 1998-2002
Strategically, even though GKL is operating in a maturing industry in Jamaica, it
has abundances of growth opportunities especially in overseas markets. For
example, in a re-launching of Grace international brands in 1999, National
Grocers from Canada approached GKL to have Grace Products listed in 700
stores across the country. The strategy was to tighten up its operations by
divesting unprofitable businesses i.e. the divestment of shareholdings in Seprod
Ltd and Caribbean Freight Forwards& Custom Brokers Limited, and 60 percent
of Computer & Controls Limited. The aim was to increase efficiency and reduce
costs. GKL has been pursuing new opportunities in information technology and
services and financial sectors which are becoming lucrative sectors in Jamaica.
These leads to GKL having better focus on its core business and creating value
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to shareholders. More Capital was invested into Financial and service sector Le.
First Global Bank Limited, especially during 2000 to 2002, as it was experiencing
rapid growth. Similarly, the remittance services sector has as electronic network
of total 162 outlets with 85 outlets in Jamaica 46 outlets in Trinidad, Tobago and
31 in Guyana. These indicated that GKL has excellent growth opportunities.
4.4.7. Internal Liquidity: Flexibility
This can be indicated by GKL's cash, cash and short term investments, cash
equivalent and total capital reserves. (See section Cash and Capital Reserves).
Table: 4.11 Indicates important liquidity ratios. Cash ratio has an increasing
trend. The company increases its cash and marketable securities as a result of
its success in generating profits over the years.
Table: 4.11 GKL and Internal Liquidity
Internal Liquidity
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Time interest earned 2.33 2.75 3.37 3.12 2.65
Current ratio 1.31 1.37 1.32 1.29 1.23
Cash ratio 0.54 0.58 0.64 0.75 0.84
Cash from operation ratio 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.16 0.37
Sources: Calculate from annual report 1998-2002
4.4.8. Firm Risk
4.4.8.1. Business risk
Degree Operating Leverage indicates the extent to which fixed costs are used in
firm's operations. Generally, firms in capital intensive industry have high fixed
costs and having high business risk, this because a relatively small change in
sales result in large change in ROE. GKL has a low level of DOL at 1.68 in 2002
compare to DOL of 3.1 in 2001. Degree Financial Leverage measures the
percentage changes in net income for a percentage changes in net operating
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income. The higher the DFL the greater the fluctuations in net income for
changes in net operating income. GKL has a fairly stable DFL at average of 1.55.
The Degree Combined Leverage which indicates the overall sensitivity of net
income to changes in sales has declined from 7.56 in 1998 down to 2.71 in 2002.
(Appendix XII). Table 4.12 shows that the trend of GKL's business risk has
reduced substantially. GKL is rated as Good- excellent the BB Credit rating by
Standard& Poor's Rating Services. The company is comprised of well diversified
business units in different industry. Thus it is expected that unsystematic risks
should be eliminated, but only systematic risk remains. The volatility of Jamaican
economy, poor GDP growth rate and high inflation leads to high interest rates,
the depreciation of the Jamaican Dollar, high unemployment and high crime rate
included with natural disaster of flood these have contributed to business risk to
all businesses. GKL also have been emphasized on operating internationally as
to benefit from local depreciated currency and gain from hard currency from
overseas. The GKL's income from operations from overseas has increased in
recent years. Currency risk is the risk that the value of financial instrument will
fluctuate due to changes in foreign exchange rates. GKL group operates
internationally and is exposed to currency risk from various currency exposures
primarily with the respect to the United States Dollar. An aggregate net foreign
liability for local group companies of approximately US$ 17,601,000 in 2000,
US$15,276,000 in 2001 and US$14,874,000 in 2002 which in respect of
transactions arising in ordinary course of business, the group currency risk is not
considered to be significant. Interest rate risk refers to the value of financial
instrument will fluctuate due to changes in market interest rates. The company
has some degree of interest rate risk. For market risk, the company has no
significant exposure to market risk as the financial instruments subject to this risk
are not material to the group. Company credit risk is low as the group has no
significant concentration of credit risk attaching to trade receivable as its has a
large customer base, with no significant balances arising from any single
economic or business sector.
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Table 4.12 Degree Combined leverage
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
% changes in PBT 10.2 19.7 23.7 29.4 31.2
% changes in Sales 2.2 3.8 0.3 9.5 18.6
DOL 4.64 5.18 1.9 3.1 1.68
DFl 1.63 1.57 1.42 1.47 1.67
DCl 7.56 8.13 2.69 4.55 2.71
Source: calculated from information from annual report 1998-2002
4.4.8.2. Financial risk
The company has a low financial risk. It has maintained conservative financing
principles. It has a low level of Debt-to-Equity ratio relative to its peer. Sources of
funds are mainly from its cash generated from the operation within the group and
from short-term investments. It has a high Net cash position. The company is
rated as BB rating by Standard & Poor's Rating Services. GKl has medium
market risk with the asset beta of 0.91 compared with NMl of 0.81. The
company's cost of equity is 20 percent. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital is
about 15-16 percent. The company DIE ratios has maintained a level of 25-38
percent. The interest rate coverage is range between 2.63 and 3.62 times which
is slightly higher than industry average of 2.43 and 3.0 times.(see table 4.13 and
4.14)
Table.4.13. GKl and Financial Risk ratios
Financial risk 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Debt-equity ratio 30.68 38.12 32.1 33.27 25.67
Long-term debt/Long-term Capital 6 12 9.8 8.1 7.1
Total debt / Total capital 1.04 1.02 0.92 1.2 1.62
Interest Coverage 2.62 3.26 3.04 2.62
Sources: calculated form annual report 1998-2002
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Table: 4.14. The GKL's Debt-ta-Equity Ratios vs. NML, ANSA MeAl and GHL
Year Beta 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
GKL 0.91 30.68% 38.12% 32.10% 33.27% 25.67%
% increase 24.2% -15.8% 3.6% -22.84%
NML 0.81 26.0% 28.0% 31.1%
ANSA MeAl 0.98 79%
GHL 1.7 10.0% 20.0% 50.0% 90.0% 90.0%
Source: adapted from http://www.jamstockex.com
4.4.9. Industry Specific
GKL is a Conglomerate firm (see its characteristics point above)
After reviewing the GKL financial performance, its position and characteristics
within its industry and economic environment have been established. Now we
see how financial manager of GKL determined its Capital Structure under such
circu mstances.
4.5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter has reviewed the information regarding GKL's standing position in
its operating environment. The industry attractiveness has evaluated. The
company's strategic position and resources have been ascertained. The next
chapter provides the reasons which underline a choice of the capital structure
mix of GKL by the Management.
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CHAPTER 5: QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN, ADMINISTRATION AND RESULTS:
FINANCIAL MANAGER'S PERSPECTIVE ON GKL'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the questionnaire's design and structure including the
results obtained from the interview with GKL Group Financial Manager on how
the Capital Structure is established. The results are important for understanding
the financing behaviour of GKL how it decides its capital structure under
particular firm characteristics and circumstances which were decided in chapters
3 and 4.
5.2. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND STRUCTURE
The questionnaire was composed based on previous research on the topic and
issues of Capital Structure. The design of the questionnaire is a combination of
the work from Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989), which was used for surveying firm's
financial manager perspectives of U.S.A. firms, and other work from various
studies was used as a guideline for designing the questionnaire which can be
summarized as follows:
Capital Structure Determinants: Evidence from Literature Review
~ Business risk - Titman and Wessels(1988)
~ Taxes -MM (1958,1963)
~ Non Debt Tax shield- DeAngelo and Masulis, (1980)
~ Bankruptcy and Financial Distress- Myers (1984)
~ Reputation - Diamond (1989)
~ Management Attitude - Barton and Gordon (1988)
~ Corporate planning principle- Whitley (1992)
~ Borrowing Capacity - Myers and Majluf (1984)
~ Credit rating - Graham and Harvey (1999)
~ Stock Price Reactions- Eckbo (1986) and Kim and stulz (1988)
~ Growth opportunity-Allen(1991)
~ Market Conditions (economy)- Korajczyk & Levy (2002)
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~ Managerial equity ownerships- Kim &Sorensen (1986)
~ Preferences toward funding sources- Donaldson (1961)
~ Transactions costs- Donaldson (1961)
~ Financial Mobility and Flexibility -Bancel and Mitto(2002)
~ Asset characteristics- Titman and Wessels( 1988)
~ Market timing- Ritter (2000)
~ Corporate Control considerations- Jensen (1986)
The first section of the questionnaire investigates the financial manager's attitude
towards the sources of funding. The second section aims to ascertain the factors
that determine a company's overall capital structure from the manager's
perspective. The respondent is the financial manager of Grace Kennedy Limited.
The interview took 45 minutes to 90 minutes to complete. The interview was
conducted at the company premises at a convenient time for the financial
manager.
5.3. FINANCIAL MANAGER'S PERSPECTIVE AND GKL'S CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
The following information is obtained from the interview with GKL's Group
Financial manager: Mr. Andrew R.Messado, the Group Financial Manager of
Grace Kennedy and Company (Appendix XIII). The discussion of the questions is
presented according to the relevant issues in addressing.
5.3.1. SECTION 1: Attitude toward Funding Sources
Question 1.a, refers to the importance of company principles in deciding on a
particular capital structure. Mr.Messado's response is that the company
considers that to strive to maintain approximately constant long term Debt-to-
Equity ratios is an important policy. Question1.b. He stated that even though
company strives to maintain its Debt-to-Equity ratios at a constant level, the GKL
does not have a specific target it is trying to achieve. GKL attempts to use first
the most advantageous sources of funds available before deciding to move on to
68
other sources which are less favourable. This is very important to the firm.
Question 2 The Financial Manager was asked to indicate preferential sources of
funds by ranking according to GKL's practice.
He ranked the sources of fund as following order:
1. Internal Equity ( Retained Income)
2. Bank Debt
3. External (new) Common Stock
4. Non-Bank Straight debt
5. Non -Bank convertible debt.
Mr. Messado added that the internal funds of GKL are substantively available in
the form of cash and short-term investments. GKL has a high level of capital
reserves. Internal Equity is considered to be cheaper than other sources. For
Bank Debt, GKL has favorable credit lines which the company can choose from
the most competitive offers made to the firm. Common stock is expensive,
complicated and time consuming. In addition, the capital market in Jamaica is not
favorable for this type of issue. The company has not used this method in raising
capital for investment. Most issues made every year were part of the Executive
Shares Option scheme and to be given as a bonus to GKL's shareholders. Non-
Bank Straight Debt and Non-Bank Convertible Debt method have also not been
employed by GKL.
Question 3: Features associated with Equity and Debt issues.
Question 3.1.Under what circumstances would you make use of Retained
Income?
The Retained Income is the normal source of funds used by GKL. It is used
when the company is expanding its internal operations, and when debt and
equity are expensive.
Question 3.2: Under what circumstances would you make use of Equity Issues?
When the firm funds major expansion and acquisition, it will make use of Equity
Financing. This has not happened in the last five years. The market conditions
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are also an important consideration for this method. He adds that GKL has
delayed the listing on NASDAQ in the year 2000 due to non-optimal market
conditions. The capital markets are more favourable for technology and services
sectors.
Question 3.3: Under what circumstance would you make use of Debt financing?
The GKL makes use of Debt under the following circumstances:
-To fund a major expansion and acquisitions
- To add to liquidity
- To fund long term assets if the market conditions are right
In addition, the interest rate on borrowing in Jamaica is higher than in any other
country in the Caribbean community and the U.S.A. thus the company borrow
more from overseas rather than from locally (see Appendix VI).
5.3.2. SECTION 2: How Financial Manager Determines Capital Structure
Question 4: Mr. Messado was asked to respond to the questionnaire by
indicating the relative importance related to issues which he is considering when
deciding on a financing mix. These questions were further probed during the
interview. The results concluded that Cost of Underwriting is an important
consideration to what type of capital it should be issued (4, a). Therefore, the
Manager prefers Retained Earnings to the firm this due to it is considered to be
cheaper than Debt and Equity. Tax on interest expense is moderately important
to GKL, but GKL's capital structures have not been driven by tax saving (4, b),
but rather by the Corporate strategic planning principle (4, q). To Maintaining the
Debt-to-Equity in line with an industry average is not important to the firm
financing decision (4, d). Also, it depends on how advantageous of each source
of funds available to GKL. The funds are obtained by weighing the costs against
benefits among the various sources. Market conditions are the most important
factors in issuing each type of capital (4, I). Market reactions to these issues are
important (4, m). However, avoiding under- pricing of securities to be issued (4,
c), and to correcting mis-pricing of outstanding securities are not applicable to
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GKL (4, f). Mr.Messado strongly emphasized the importance of the possibility of
becoming insolvent (4, g). He ranked matching maturity of assets and liabilities
as important policy to the firm (4, e).he further that GKL maintains a moderate
financing policy stance due to the consideration of costs and risks associated
with sources of funds. He explained that the matching principle in which the
maturity structure of finance matches the maturity of the project assets, GKL
finances fixed assets and current assets which are needed on permanent basis
through long term sources, while current assets where financing need vary
throughout the year are financed by short term borrowings. He considered
projected cash flows from the assets to be financed as very important(4, h) as
well as financial flexibility (4, p), Voting Control (4, k) was ranked important, risk
of being taken over (4, j), restrictive covenants of senior securities (4, i). Credit
rating and company's reputation (4, r) are also most important in deciding capital
structure choices. He gave emphasis on GKL's most important aim is to
maximize shareholders 'wealth (4, o).Thus, the effect of each sources of funding
on cost of capital was considered as the most important as because the lower
the cost of capital means the higher the EPS consequently shareholders' wealth
increases.
Question 5, 7, and 8: GKL's Equity and equity held by management
These questions aim to ascertain proportions of Equity, Intangible Asset, and
proportion of Equity held by management.
Responses: The equity is between 60 percent and 80 percent (Q, 5)
compounded in GKL's capital structure. An Intangible Asset over total assets is
less than 1 percent (Q, 7). The company has bought international brands but that
was paid in cash and has written-off as an expense. Therefore, Intangible Assets
is very low compared to Total Assets. Proportion of Equity owned by
management is between 10 percent and 20 percent (Q, 8).
Question 6: the questions aimed to ascertain how Jamaican economy affects
GKL's choices of financing mix. Mr.Messado strongly agreed that the current
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stage of Jamaican economy has an impact on GKL's financing mix and on the
availability of sources of capital (Q, 6a, b). Under this economy firm has the
preference on Debt over Equity (Q, 6d) even though interest rate in Jamaica is
higher than its neighbouring countries in the same region. Q6, c, the recent
Jamaica economy affects the preference of equity over Debt is not applicable to
GKL as it has not employed this method for the last five years.
Question 9: what is your firm's total market value of equity?
He answered according to the Annual report of 2002; page 9, (see also Table
3.7) current market value of equity is at approximately 12.3 billion which
increased from 5.2 billion of 2001. GKL's market value has been lower than its
book value during 1998-2001, but in 2002 the market value is reported much
higher than book value.
Question 10: What is your weighted Average Cost of Capital?
He answered that the WACC of the company is between 15-16 percent.
Question 11: How would you describe your firm's future investment
opportunities?
He answered that the firm has an abundance of opportunities in the year to come
both locally and internationally and it has been part of the strategic plan to
capture these opportunities (also see chapter 4)
Question 12: How is your firm current strategy affect the firm debt-to-equity mix?
He answered that the firm are in the growth mode and it is employing an
aggressive growth expansion. Thus the firm prefers to have lower level of debt. It
maintains high capital reserves which important to firm's strategic operation and
management flexibility. During this five year period the debt level have been
reduced from the highest 38.12 percent in 1999 down to 25.67 percent in 2002(
also see chapter 4), this because there has been a massive expansion and
improving operating efficiency of existing business. Mr.Messado stated that the
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Debt-to-Equity is expected to increase in 2003 due to the company having more
investment opportunities to pursue.
Question 13: How risky is your firm position in industry? What are main sources
of risk?
He answered that the firm has less risk than its rivals in Jamaica as it has a well
diversified range of business in different industry. There is a concern on
economical risks as most almost 70 percent of income still depends on the local
economy which is volatile.
Question 14: given new profitable opportunities which the company cannot take
without doing one of the following, your firm will most likely choose to:
-Depart from the target Debt! Equity ratio**
-Cut dividends
-Sell-off other assets
-Pass up the profitable investment.
Mr. Messado explained that the company cannot invest in new opportunities
without departing from the target Debt / Equity ratios. To cut dividends is not
good for the company shareholders. One of the reasons that have increased
investor's confidence in GKL performance is that the promise to provide a return
on capital to shareholders, and the firm's disciplined approach to Balance Sheet
management. Thus, the company set constant dividends of 11.75 percent of
earnings with 88 percent remaining in business. The reason is to enable GKL to
invest in new opportunities without having to pass up the profitable investment or
borrowing funds at the wrong time. The company sells off its assets only when
those particular assets are not productive and have very few benefits to the
business.
The next question aimed to ascertain the issue of GKL's Information Asymmetry.
Question 15: According to your estimation, your firm's outstanding securities are
priced fairly by the market for what percentage of the time:
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Mr.Messado responded that GKL's securities are priced fairly of more than 80
percent of the time. The company has been constantly communicating with its
shareholders and to the public openly about its stage and strategic plans of
management and future prospects.
Question 16: It probed about tax structure in Jamaica and how it affects the
firm's decision on particular types of funding sources used in Capital Structure.
Mr. Messado said that tax in Jamaica has favoured Retained Earnings, Debt and
then the least for External Equity. The company has not been considering Tax
reduction on debt interest payment as a mean to increase shareholders' values.
It has very little benefit to GKL.
5.4. CONCLUSION
Grace, Kennedy Limited (GKL)'s characteristic behaviour was reviewed. The
interview's results with the Financial Manager have added further information on
how the GKL deals with its capital structure. This information is important for the
evaluation in the next chapter as regards how GKL makes capital structure
decisions, and the extent to which practice have met theories.
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CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF CASE STUDY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the discussion of the results obtained from the
questionnaire. (Appendix XIII). The factors which are related to the STOT (Tax,
Bankruptcy Costs and Agency Costs) and POT (Information Asymmetry and
Signalling, Transaction Costs) will be analyzed. The results will be discussed
together with the evaluation of the gap between the theory discussed in chapter
two and the case study discussed in Chapter 3-5.
6.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section is an evaluation of results obtained from the Financial Manager's
questionnaire and from the interview. This research is descriptive in nature. The
information is obtained from one company, Grace, Kennedy Limited (GKL).
Company's past performance and industry average was used as benchmark in
this study. In order to comprehensively understand how the firm makes financing
decisions, literature reviews have suggested the interview with the Financial
Manager would enable us to understand the reason behind the firm financing
behaviour. Thus, the financing behaviour of GKL will be discussed following the
STOT and POT Model incorporating GKL's characteristics outlined in chapter 3
and 4.
6.2.1. Tax Benefits and Costs of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
GKL found that tax shield benefits (04, b) are slightly important but are not the
most important factor for capital structure decision as suggested by MM (1963)
and Stewart et al. (1988). Consistent with Norton (1991) and Titi et al. (1995),
although GKL has taken a tax factor into account, the Capital Structure decisions
are not driven by benefits of tax shield. Mr.Messado, the financial Manager
stated that the GKL has only minimal benefits from tax bills reduction of interest's
payments. This may be because the firm has a large amount of Tax Loss Carry-
Forwards (TLCF) (see Tax, Chapter 3). This was explained by Mackie-Mason
(1990) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that firms which have high TLCF and
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Non-Debt-Tax Shield are not unlikely to gain benefit of tax reduction, due to the
firm's tax saving capacity has already been exhausted through these sources. In
contrast to Graham (1996), GKL's effective marginal tax rate has no relationship
with the firm debt's level, and consistent with Alien (1991) that the tax
considerations would not divert GKL from the broad thrust of the overall strategic
policies.
According to Diamond (1989), GKL's characteristics of having a long term track
record is considered to have lower default probabilities. It has a beta risk factor of
0.91 with a large and well diversified range of businesses. The firm is financially
secure with a high level of cash, strong financial reserves and borrowing
capacity. In spite of these facts GKL disagreed with Stewart et al (1988) that it
should borrow more in order to take full advantage of tax benefits even though it
can comfortably service the debt. Mr. Messado's opinion is that having too much
debt in capital structure creates concerns regards potential costs of Financial
Distress and Bankruptcy (004, g). Thus, consistent with POT suggested by Myers
(1984). GKL has a negative relationship between its profits and growth
opportunity and the level of leverage, but threats of bankruptcy costs are not the
cause of this relationship. GKL acknowledged the expensive costs associated
with bankruptcy situation as suggested by Warner (1977a, 1977b) and Altman
(1984). Due to this consideration GKL has an upper limit at 50 percent Debt.
GKL's current position is not concerned about these costs as its financial health
and overall operations are far from bankruptcy in spite of operating in the poor
economy of Jamaica. Instead, GKL gives serious consideration to the
relationship with its suppliers and customers in deciding the levels of debt. This
may be because GKL has a high proportion of debts which are short-term bank
loans, while the main source of GKL's current liabilities has been provided by its
suppliers. Therefore, it is very important for GKL to have a low level of debt and
therefore lower risk with the level of credit rating at BB, which indicates Good-
excellent credit. This fact is in conflict with Haugen and Senbet (1978) who
argued that Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Costs have no bearing
relationship between the firm and its suppliers or customers, but only for
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shareholders and bondholders. More evidence was found to be consistent with
the Graham and Harvey survey (2001), which found that although debt provides
tax bills reduction, firms are concerned about financial flexibility and credit ratings
when issuing debt and are also worried about the dilution of share earnings
when issuing equity (4q,r). Tax factor is the most important consideration for
large, regulated and dividend paying firms. In contrast, GKL argues that the level
of corporate tax is not an incentive to use debt, and also GKL does not have a
specified target debt-to-equity ratio and then to issue equity for maintaining that
ratio as stated by Graham and Harvey (2001). Mr.Messado pointed out that the
company does not have a specific target ratio, but it remains on the conservative
side of policy. The levels of leverage have been low on average of 30 percent. It
is not only for obtaining credit from suppliers at better rates, but also
accommodating the firm's current situation as GKL is pursuing a rapid growth
strategy where high levels of growth opportunities are available to the firm locally
and internationally. This low level of debt also enables GKL to equip itself for
coping with its changing environments and the ability to deal with the unexpected
of "worst case scenarios". Furthermore, GKL does not borrow in industry terms
as suggested by Geyer et al. (1994), Munshi (1990), and Bevan and Danbolt
(2000). The industry effect influences Capital Structure decisions, and even
though the debt-to-equity ratio is similar to NML, Mr.Messado stated that industry
norms are not important for GKL setting the Capital Structure (4, d).
6.2.2. Agency costs and Capital Structure Decision
Agency Costs of Debt are borne by the Firm owners as the result of potential
conflicts between debt holders and equity holders and between managers and
equity holders. The choice of capital structure can mitigate these conflicts, and is
the one that in some circumstances reduce the costs arising from such conflicts
(see Harris and Raviv, 1991).
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6.2.2.1. GKL and Conflicts between Managers and Shareholders
The GKL's policy is not in conformance with Jensen and Meckling (1976),
who stated that managers spend less effort in investing and managing a firm and
firm's resources if they own only a small fraction of residual claim, but have to
bear all costs of activities. Consequently, they do not capture the entire gain from
the profit enhancement activities. Therefore, the managers may transfer those
resources to themselves. For example, by consuming "perquisites" such as a
luxurious offices and vehicles, private jets, building "empire" and so on, which
these costs are borne by shareholders. Even though GKL's management's
interests are only small fraction of between 10 percent to 20 percent total capital
(0.8), GKL has always been operated on prudent policies. Furthermore, GKL has
linked compensation with performance by creating the Stock Option Plan for the
directors and employees. For example in 2002, the amount of 7,167,792 shares
was allocated to executive directors and the amount of 720,000 shares for non-
executive directors. GKL feels that managers and employees are more motivated
and put their best efforts into achieving the company's target. Mr.Messado
explained that the company has a well established corporate governance and
strategy which is used as guidelines in pursuing any ventures. GKL has criteria in
selecting investments i.e. the return on equity of 20 percent and growth rate of 10
percent, with cash generation along with synergy that new business would
contribute to existing businesses. In addition, GKL has a monitoring Board of
Directors and Auditors He stated that the Agency Costs of potential conflicts
have been monitored and taken into consideration at corporate level. Thus, the
Manager responded that agency conflict is not important to GKL in deciding on
Capital Structure, as there is already a well defined monitoring system in place.
So, management can devote more time and energy in creating shareholders
'value. Thus, GKL does not provide evidence for the claims of Jensen (1986)
and Wildsmith (1974) that management does not automatically seek to maximize
return on capital, but instead is interested in pursuing growth rather than
profitability, in order to gain benefit through larger compensation which is
associated with the firm' size. In addition to reasons as given by Jensen and
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Meckling (1984), GKL's current strategy is to pursue rapid growth. It is
reasonable, as according to SWOT analysis (see above), for the company is in a
strong position as regards financial and human capital resources accompanied
by high growth opportunities. Thus, pursuing growth is a strategic plan from
corporate level and not because of the managers' motive to gain from
compensation which is based on increasing size. GKL has a good structure of
compensation in place, so agency costs of equity are not the main concern for
GKL. In addition, the company has never obtained funds through raising equity.
The reason for that is given as follows: i) the company does not need external
funds as it has internal funds available; ii) this method is expensive and time-
consuming (Donalson, 1961) and Myers (1984) ; iii) the equity market in Jamaica
is not suitable for such method; iv) the market timing is not right, i.e. the
company's attempt to list its shares in NASDAQ in the year 2000 has been
delayed as the US market favors technology and service sectors. Explanations
for this were given by the market timing of Banker and Wurgler (2002) and by the
window of opportunities of Ritter (2002), which consistent with evidences found
by Graham and Harvey (2001 ).These observations support the POT.
GKL disagreed with Jensen (1986) that debt is used as a control mechanism to
reduce agency problems by protecting overinvestment, especially, for mature
and profitable firms with substantial cash and capital reserves like GKL. The firm
is not in the stage of overinvestment situations because of GKL having an
abundance of investment opportunities locally and internationally. It has been
paying out cash by declaring dividend, and through stock repurchase plan as
suggested by Jensen (1986). However, this amount is at a constant level as part
of dividend policy, not because to solve overinvestment problems. Overall Mr.
Messado concluded that the GKL does not consider Agency Costs between
managers and shareholders when deciding on its capital structure.
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6.2.2.2. GKL and Conflicts between Bondholders and Shareholders
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested the restrictive covenants as a tool to
mitigate potential conflicts of Agency problem imposed by bondholders when
debt becomes too risky. GKL stated that restrictive covenants are the most
important consideration for deciding on debt issues (4.i). The Financial Manager
stated that due to our Jamaican economy (Q.6) with high interest rates due to
high rate of inflation the firm has never been using Debt Issues or Convertible
Debt issued in raising funds. Covenants are used as a tool to control asset
substitutions and overinvestment investment problems (Jensen, 1976), but it put
restrictions to management's operating decisions. The Financial Manager
therefore prefers internally generated funds. So far they have been able to fund
current operations from internal sources. The Company has been having a good
relationship with its banks, suppliers and creditors. It has an abundance of credit
lines and therefore it does not normally favor issuing debt. This is because GKL
does not need such debt as it has internal funds that are liquid enough for its
operations. However, he further stated the circumstances where GKL would
make use of a debt issue (Q3.3) as follows: i) to fund major expansion and
acquisition; ii) to add to liquidity and to fund long-term assets if market conditions
are right. In this question the manager did not indicate that the firm will issue debt
only when internal fund has already been exhausted as suggested by POT, but
the market conditions are the main concern when issuing debt. Thus, this
evidence shows support of market timing argument of Ritter (2002), Banker and
Wurgler (2002), Bancel and Miito (2002) and Graham and Harvey (2001). When
discussing the Agency problems with regards to the issues of direct wealth
transfers, asset substitutions, and underinvestment. The Financial Manager
agreed with Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) that GKL have
incentive to invest in relatively safe projects out of reputational considerations,
but nevertheless those project must meet investment criteria (Q.4 r). GKL
reputation as a large conglomerate has been long established since 1922. It has
a strong asset structure (see tangibility) with a proportion of less than 1 percent
of intangible assets (Q.7). Tangibility (ratio of fixed assets to total assets)
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represents the effect of collateral value on the firm's leverage level which was
suggested having a positive relationship with leverage (Rajan and Zingales,
1995). GKL has employed only small portion of long-term debt in its capital
structure. The main sources of debt come from short-term bank borrowing and
from Creditors. The proportion unsecured debts are much larger than the
secured debt for short-term loans and long-term loans. (Appendix VII).This
shows that the firm's reputation of its long term success for more than 80 years
has contributed to such advantages. Thus, cost of debt covenants creates cost of
lost investment opportunities due to firm have incentive to invest in suboptimal
projects is not applicable to GKL. Mr Messado agrees with Harris and Raviv
(1991) that too much debt causes the firm to have less efficiency and flexibility
especially in economic down-turn. Thus, he prefers to maintain the capital
reserves, and having lower levels of debt as the company is planning to further
its expansion in the near future, and capturing its growth opportunities. This is
contrast with Jensen (1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995), who suggested that
the debts to equity ratios for mature firms are expected to be high in order to
control overinvestment problems. However, GKL's leverage level is maintained at
fairly constant and low level (see leverage). This may be because of, even
though GKL is a mature firm in Jamaica. It has great investment opportunities.
Thus, the evidence is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and
Wessels (1988), who suggested the negative relationship between firm's growth
opportunities and its DIE ratios.
6.2.3. GKL and Attitude toward Funding Sources
Evidence as regards GKL's attitude towards funding sources was found to be
consistent with the POT of Donaldson (1961), Myers and Majluf (1984), Pinegar
and Wilbrincht (1989), and Graham and Harvey (2000). GKL has no well defined
target Debt/Equity ratio, in contrast to Static Trade-Off Theory (STOT) where the
optimal structure is the balance of the trade-off between cost and benefits of
debts as discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1984), and Jensen
(1986). GKL raises funds according to its preferred order due to the costs
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associated with each of the sources. Internally generated funds (Retained
Income) are the most preferred to debt, and the last resources are equity.
GKL's financing behaviour was found to follow patterns of financing hierarchies,
i.e. POT (Myers, 1984). GKL does not have target debt ratios in deciding on its
capital structure. The questions (0.1 b) and (0.2) aimed at ascertaining Financial
Manager's attitude toward sources of funding by ranking the sources of
preferences. He ranks Internal Equity or Retained Earnings as the most
preferable, then Bank Debt, and the last resource is External Equity or Common
Stock. The company has never been employed Non-Bank Straight-Debt and
Non-Bank Convertible Debt. He gave reasons that Retained Earnings are
cheapest and convenient due to no transaction costs and fees involved (O.4.a)
(Myers, 1984 and Donaldson, 1961). It is used when the firm is expanding its
internal operations and when debt and equity are expensive (0.3.1 ).Bank debt is
secondly preferred as GKL has good relationship with banks, thus it can borrow
at reasonable rates. It uses debt to fund major expansion and acquisitions, to
add to liquidity and to fund long term assets if the market conditions are right
(0.3.3). The last resources are equity. However, the firm has never been
employed this method for raising funds, because it is considered as too
expensive and too time consuming (Alien, 1991). Furthermore, He added that
lower level of debt allows firm more flexibility. Mr. Messado neither agreed with
Stewart et al (1988) that GKL should increase it debt in capital structure in order
to gain benefit from tax reduction nor did he agree with Jensen (1986) as to
employ more debt as tool for controlling an overinvestment even though GKL's
characteristics and position favourable for such activities. GKL is a mature and
profitable corporation with massive cash and near cash available for taking any
venture. The investment strategy and corporate financing principle are used to
underline each investment decisions. Thus, the firm has no concern on
overinvestment problems. GKL prefers to have Capital Reserves (O.4p) in order
to take advantage of cheap borrowing and good investment opportunities when
they arise. The large sum of GKL's debt in capital structure is from short-term
bank loans and creditors. Therefore, maintaining low level of DIE ratios is
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important for seeking loans as it perceived as lower risk. It seemed like to
maintain credit rating is important to GKL's financing decision, which consistent
with the evidence found by Graham and Harvey (2000).
6.2.4. GKL Information Asymmetry and Signalling
Mr. Messado agreed with Myers and Majuf (1984) that managers act in the best
interest of existing shareholders as GKL seeks to maximize shareholders' wealth
as the most important consideration (004.0). He also recognised the importance
of information problem to stock market reactions to the issue as suggested by
Ross (1977). The information problem does not only lead to a higher cost of
borrowing but also the declining in share price on an announcement.Thus, to
ensure that outside investors have the right information is important for GKL's
issuing of capital whether to issue debt or equity. Mr. Messado stated that GKL
has less Information problems. The company has been communicating with
shareholders and public regularly and openly regards a firm's operations, current
earnings, growth opportunities and future prospects. Thus, most of its securities
are fairly priced by the market more than 80 percent of most of the time (0.17).
GKL has never faced a situation where it has to pass-up positive NPV projects as
it has large cash, marketable securities and large reserves available to take up
with such projects whenever opportunity exists. GKL has never issued equity as
a means to raise capital because the firm does not need external funds, so
avoiding under pricing of securities to be issued thus is not inapplicable to GKL
(OA.c).GKL's financial manager stated that he does consider Information
Asymmetry factor in deciding about capital structure. Stock market reactions to
the issue are a very important consideration to what kind of capital to be issued.
Even though, he stated that GKL does not have an Information Asymmetry
problem. He agreed with Ross (1977), Fama (1985) and Myers and Majluf (1984)
that GKL uses leverage raise its debt's level in capital structure to convey its
optimism of future prospect as good news, but this method has only very short
term effects, but Mr. Messado did not give a clear answer to the argument of
Leland and Pyle (1977).
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In contrast to Hull (1999), Hatfield et al. (1994), and Masulis (1983) who studied
the relationship between firm's leverage and industry average, GKL is not taking
industry norm into consideration when deciding on the Capital Structure. GKL is
more concerned about its strategy and availability of positive NPV projects, and
the firm's need for funds (Q.4. d,q). The extent to which the POT model holds
relates to the aspect of stock market price reactions as suggested by Viswanath
(1993), Mikkelson and Partch (1986)and Eckbo (1986) could unfortunately not be
ascertained, because GKL has never issued convertible debt or straight debt.
Thus, no information is given on these issues as well as on equity issues.
Nevertheless, he agreed with Myers (1984) that an Equity Issue is not only an
expensive method to raise capital, it also subjected to outside interference which
endangers the potential loss of control to outsiders (Hutchison et aI., 1998).
6.3. GKL AND THE STATIC TRADE-OFF MODEL
According to the analysis above, Financing behaviour of GKL is not clearly
identified with the STOT model which suggests the firm has a specific target of
an optimal capital structure and can be found through balancing the benefits of
tax shield against costs of financial distress (Myers, 1984), Agency costs of debt
and equity against tax shield benefits( Jensen and Meckling, 1984), and benefit
of debt as a control mechanism of overinvestment against the costs of lost
investment opportunities(Jensen,1986). Even though GKL strive to maintain an
approximately constant long term Debt/Equity ratio( Q,1 a) as if the firm has a
target, but the results from the interview have shed light to an answer that GKL
does not have a specific target Debt/Equity ratio. Instead the evidence found that
firm financing behaviour is more clearly identified with POT model predictions.
However, there are some questions that can be debated here that GKL's
financing behaviour may follow the STOT Model.
i) In accordance with Myers (1984) where tax benefits are trade-off against cost
of financial distress. It is possible that GKL may trade off the costs of financial
distress and bankruptcy cost with the benefit of tax shield, but because GKL is in
a tax loss position the amount of which higher than tax shield benefits(see tax
84
Chapter 3). Therefore, the firm may have acknowledged that the benefits of tax-
shield are minimal compared to the cost of having more debt which would
increase risk for the firm. Thus tax saving on interest expenses was considered
by GKL financial Manager only slightly important (04, b) for deciding on the
capital structure. However GKL does benefit from the Non-Debt Tax Shields.
GKL taxes information was found to be inconsistent with DeAngelo's and
Masulis's (1980) suggestion that firms with a high non-debt tax shield are
expected to have less debt, and also Ross (1985) that firm have less incentive to
use debt as Non-Debt Tax-Shield Increase. Instead the evidence was found that
the level of debt is not affected by the level of non debt tax shield or the expected
marginal tax rate as suggested by Mason (1990) and Graham (1996).( see Tax
Chapter 4).
ii) In accordance with the Agency Problem issues Trade-off against benefits of
debt and/or equity. It is very likely that GKL may also acknowledge the Agency
problems suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as it has already
established the tool as suggested by Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1977) in its corporate governance (Stock Option plans and performance liked
based compensation) in order to mitigate such conflicts. This tool also provides
the solution to the problem that may arise in accordance to the Free Cash Flow
problem in a mature and highly profitable firm according to Jensen (1986) and
Stewart et al. (1988). However, the STOT suggest that GKL should have high
level of debt. In contrast with GKL which having a lower level of leverage in spite
of having large amount of cash and near cash available. This because GKL need
to increase its flexibility in order to take advantage of profitable investment
opportunities, hence it follows the POT rather than the STOT where lowering the
leverage due to the concerns of risk for financial distress and high costs of
potentially bankruptcy. However, GKL does give consideration to the bankruptcy
issue, but because the firm is not in this position therefore the trade off between
these costs may not be seen clearly. Thus the firm may follow the STOT model,
but it does not try to find the optimal capital structure where the trade-off between
costs and benefits is optimal. Hence, the firm has no specific target debt ratio.
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Instead, it capital structure is driven by the consideration of the availability of
profitable investment opportunities, the need of capital investments, the costs
which are associated with each sources of fund and more importantly by its
strategic planning at corporate level.
6.4. GKL WITH PECKING ORDER THEORY
GKL's financing behaviour was found to be clearly consistent with predictions of
the POT model by Myers (1977), Donaldson (1961), Myers and Majuf (1984),
Penigar and Wilbrincht (1989) and Graham and Harvey (2001).
GKL does not have the target Debt! Equity ratio. The Firm has preference
toward funding sources (Q, 2) by internal retained earnings is most preferred
then debt and the last resource is new issue of common equity. This because of
the consideration of costs which are associated with each source of the funds as
suggested by Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986). The
GKL makes a debt issue only when the internal source of funds is not sufficient.
However, debt issues have never been employed in this period. Thus, the capital
structure of GKL is driven by the accumulated need for funds. Operating and
strategic plan decisions are the prime determinants of GKL financing needs. GKL
is a well established firm with sufficient cash and near cash in form of marketable
securities available. GKL's financial behaviour favours the POT model as GKL
has maintained the leverage at lower levels in spite of its high profit and Free
Cash Flow. To maintain high levels of financial reserves is motivated by the
desire to maintain flexibility (Bancel and Mitto, 2002), the cheaper cost of Internal
Fund than other sources (Myers, 1984), and Information Asymmetry problems
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Brigham and Gapenski, 1997). The latter factor is
considered important as it allows a firm to access funds at the most
advantageous costs and to take advantage of good investment opportunities.
Locally, the information problem for GKL does not exist due to its solid reputation
with good-excellent (BB) Credit Ratings and its excellent communication with the
public openly and regularly. Internationally, GKL considers this factor as very
important in deciding on levels of Debt in Capital Structure, especially while
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preparing itself for public listing of securities at the NASDAQ in near future. This
method of GKL is consistent with the explanation of market timing and window of
opportunity (Banker and Wurgler, 2002; Ritter, 2002; Graham and Harvey, 2001).
6.5. CONCLUSION
As can be seen in the analysis above, the GKL's Financial Manager,
Mr.Messado has given much insight into how GKL deals with its Capital
Structure. The explanation of the relationships between Debt to Equity ratios and
GKL's characteristics associated with GKL's financing behaviour has been
clarified. GKL's financing behaviour according to the STOT and POT seemed not
mutually exclusive. It can arguably that GKL follows the STOT model, but there
was a clear pattern of the firm financing behaviour consistent with the POT
model. It is evident that even though the firm may have changed its leverage in
the same manner as predicted by the theoretical model, the reasons for changing
DIE ratios cannot be precisely predicted and understood. Thus, the interview is




The optimal Capital Structure is the specific DIE mix that maximizes the
company's overall value. This study has ascertained how GKL, a Jamaican
leading corporation determines financing mix according to the two contrasting
theories. The STOT, which assert that an optimal capital structure exists and firm
is trying to achieve that target ratio versus the POT, which assert there is no
target Capital Structure. The Capital Structure for the POT derives from a firm's
accumulative need of funds and cost factors associated with each source which
lead the firm to have different preference toward each funding source. The
evidence found that GKL financing behavior is consistent with POT. The
interview with GKL Group Financial Manager explains the fundamental issues
underlining the GKL's capital structure decision.
7.2. GKL FINANCING BEHAVIOR
GKL financing behavior possess the characteristic of the trade-off model but the
evident found more clearly that GKL's financing behaviour is consistent with POT
as suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Pinegar and Wilbrincht (1989).
The following conclusions can be drawn:
i) GKL follows the financing hierarchy by using Internal Capital funds as most
preferable and short-term bank loans and advantageous credit lines. GKL has
never made public issues of debt and equity to fund its business. It has no
specific target of the capital mix. If it would seek external finance it would take the
cheapest source first.
ii) Financing decisions appear to be more related to the characteristics of the
firm's current investment projects rather than the firm's tax and bankruptcy
circumstances.
iii) There is evidence found in support of Signaling argument related to financing
decisions by the use of debt but only for short-term effect. The company is
free from Information Asymmetry problems locally, but there is some concern
in this area related to GKL's international public offering plan.
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iv) Corporate strategic financial planning principles are more important in
governing financing decisions than the Capital Structure Theories; corporate
governance is a tool to reduce Agency conflicts has already been put in place
. GKL is likely to have only few Agency problems.
v) Capital Structure decisions are less binding than investment or dividend
decisions.
vi) The market timing and economic circumstances play an important role in
Capital Structure decisions, but industry norms do not.
vii) The company history and reputation is an advantageous factor for GKL's
Capital Structure.
7.3. GKL AND THE DETERMINANTS
The Fundamental factors GKL takes into consideration in deciding on Capital
Structure are as follows:
1. Corporate strategy 8.Bankruptcy costs
2. Taxes 9. Control
3. Transactions costs 1O.lnvestment opportunities
4. Investment opportunities 11. Lenders and credit rating
5. Market conditions and timing 12. Cost of Capital
6. Reputation 13.Management attitude
7. Financial flexibility and Capital reserves and Borrowing capacity
7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS
According to the evidence gained from the above analysis, GKL is a well
established and financially strong company. Characteristically GKL has a high
level of Tangibility of JM$2.1 bn, capital reserves of JM$ 4.2 billion, massive cash
and marketable securities of more than JM$ 11.2 billion in 2002, which shows
that it is comparatively has low to medium business risk and financial risk. In
addition, it is a well diversified business into six different industries. It could be
theoretically possible to increase its leverage without suffering financial distress.
Also GKL can comfortably service its debt thus it is also recommended that GKL
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should try to optimize shareholders' wealth (to lower the cost of capital) by trying
to find the trade-off level where debt should be accepted as long as the gain from
tax exceeds the cost of financial distress as suggested by the STOT. The level
capital structure has been at 25 percent compared to NML of 31. It is considered
to be under-geared, but the company has preferred to maintain its capital
structure at this level, for the reason that GKL follows prudent policy. In terms of
the strategic planning of GKL, pursuing Rapid Growth Strategies, it has been
expanding geographically in local and international markets. It aims at increasing
the earnings from outside Jamaica by 50 percent in 2005. GKL's master plan is
to become independent from Jamaican economy and to reduce its volatility of
earnings by diversifying sources of income, especially from overseas. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that GKL has an appropriate level of capital structure,
which provides efficiency and flexibility in achieving its strategic plans.
7.4.1. Recommendations for Future Research
The rapid changes of the economic environment lead to the firm to find new ways
of doing business. The thus effect of these dynamic changes on the firm's
optimal capital structure relates to sources of funding is an interesting area of
future study. Also the challenge of a newly emerging theory, Market Timing which
argues that firm's optimal Capital Structure is not related to the POT or STOT,
but an accumulated outcome of past attempts to time the market (Banker and
Wurgler, 2002). Also, the extent to which POT holds as suggested by Viswanath
(1993, pg214) can be further investigated in relation to the market condition in
2000s. The Market condition in the 2000s allows firms which are newer, smaller,
and riskier in growth option to have greater access to equity market which can be
used as a means to draw large cash reserves (Sheehan 2001).
7.5. CONCLUSION
This study has shown factors that influence GKL's financing decisions. The
optimal Capital Structure cannot be explained solely by one singular theory. The
evidence on GKL financing behavior has some support for the STOT, but more
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clear evidences on the POT model. The interview provided insights in GKL's
Corporate Strategic Planning, Financial Flexibility, Transactions Costs,
Reputation, Credit rating, investment opportunities and Market conditions as
important factors or considerations. There is some concern related to Information
Asymmetry but no evidence found on Agency Costs and Tax shield benefits.
GKL maintain lower level of DIE ratios according to its conservative policy and to
have the ability to meet future challenges. However GKL approaches financial
policy it is evident that it is suitable for GKL as it has been enjoying continuous
success for almost 84 years.
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Interest rate: "100/0 pa
Proposed Capital Structure
Recession Expected Exoansion
EPS RO.50 R 3.00 R 5.50
Earnings for 100 shares 50.00 300.00 550.00
Net cost = 100 shares at R20 = R2000
Original Capital Structure and Homemade Leverage
Recession Expected Expansion
EPS R 1.25 R 2.50 R 3.75
Earnings for 200 shares 250.00 500.00 750.00
Less: interest on R2000 at 10% 200.00 200.00 200.00
Net earnings 50.00 300.00 550.00
Net cost - 200 shares at R20/share - amt borrowed - R4000 - R2000 = R2000
Finance I 2000 3
Source: www.commerce.uct.ac.za/managementstudies/ bus219/Documents/m&m.ppt
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APPENDIX 11 (page, 34 and 42)
Summary of result from previous studies
Size
+e -e GKL
Raian and Zingales(1995) Titman and Wessels(1988) -e
Friend & Lang (1988) Baton and Gordon (1988)
Tan2ibility
Raian and Zingales(1995) Barton and Gordon(1988) +e




Bradley/Jarrell/Kim (1984) Kim&Sorensen (1986) -e
Industry effect
Bradley/Jerrell/ Kim(1984)
Friend & Lang (1988)
Earnin2s Volatility I Risks
Kim & Sorensen(1986) Bradley/Jarrelll Kim(1984)





Barely et al (1995)
Myers(1977) info Asym
Titman &Wessels (1988)
Rajan and Zingales (1995)
-e indicates negative relationship with DIE ratios.
+e indicates positive relationship with DIE ratios.
Source: Obtained from literature review of previous studies
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APPENDIX III (page, 33 and 42)
According to the literature review above, summary of finding from previous research
on firm optimal capital structure decision follows the POT or STOT Model, the
determinant factors were founds to be as follows;
Taxes and Bankruptcy Costs
1, firm should have more debt as possible, Yes: Graham and Harvey (2001), corporate
to gain from tax shield benefit tax advantage of debt most important in
(MM (1958,1963) capital structure decision especially for
large firm.
2. firm with non-debt tax shield has less NO; Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984)
incentive to use debt (DeAngelo and Yes: Mackie-Mason (1990)
Masulis, 1980)
3. firm with high marginal tax rates has
greater incentive to use debt
(Mason,1990: and Graham, 1996)
Agency Models
Theoretical result (source) Empirical evidence
Debt Issues
1) Stock price increase on announcement Yes: Kim & Stulz (1988)
of debt issues, debt for equity exchanges, No: Eckbo
or stock repurchases and decreses on (1986)*,Mikkelson&Partch(1986)*
announcement of equity issues or equity
for debt exchanges ( Harris & Raviv
(1990a), Stulz(1990) Hirshleifer & Debt for equity exchanges
Thakor(1989) Yes: Masulis (1980,1983)
III
Stock Repurchases
Yes; Masulis (1980), Dann,et al.(1989)
Equity Issues
Yes: Mikelsom and Partch (1986), Masulis
& Kowar(1986)
Leverage is positively correlated to firm
value (Harris & Raviv (1990a), Stulz(1990)
Leverage increases with lack of growth
opportunities(Jensen & Meckling,1976),
Stulz(1990)
Leverage increases with decreases in
profitability (Change, 1987)
Leverage increase with increase in Free-
Cash -Flow(Jensen, 1986),( Stulz,1990)
Firm with longer track records have lower
default probabilities( Daimond,1989)
Leverage is negatively correlated with
interest coverage ratio (Harris and
Raviv,1990a)
Leverage increase with increases in
importance of managerial reputation
(Hirshleifer& Thekor, 1989)
Equity for Debt exchanges
Yes: Masulis (1980,1983), Eckbo (1986)
Yes: Cornett & Travlos(1989), Dann,et
al.(1989)
Yes: Kim& Sorensen(1986), Titiman &
Wessels(1988)
NO: Kester(1986)
Yes: Kester (1986), Friend &
Hasbrouck(1988), Friend& Lang (1988)
No: Chaplinsky&Niehaus(1990)
Asymmetry Information Model
Stock price increases on announcement Debt Issues
of debt issues, debt-for-equity Yes: Kim & Stulz (1988)
IV
exchanges, or stock repurchase and No: Dann& Mikkelson(1984)*, Eckbo(1986)*
decreases on announcement of equity- Debt-for-Equity exchanges
for-debt exchanges( Ross,1977; Yes: Masulis (1980,1983), Cornett&
Narayanan,1988) Travlos(1989)
Equity-for-Debt Exchanges
Yes: Masulis(1980,1983), Eckbo (1986),
Mikkelson &Parth (1986)
Stock Repurchases
Yes: Masulis (1980), Dann(1981),
Dann(1981)
Stock price is unaffected by the debt See previous cell
issues (Myers& Mujluf, 1984),
Korajczyk,et al., 1990c)
Leverage increases with increases in Yes: Long & Malitz(1985)*
profitability( Ross ,1977; Leland& No; Kester(1986), Titman & wessels(1988)
Pyle,1977)
Leverage increases with decreases in Yes: Chalin & Niehaus(1990)
free cash flow (Myers & Mujluf, 1984)
Stock price decreases on announcement Yes: Masulis & Kowar(1986), Mikkelson &
of equity issue (Ross,1977; Myers& Partch(1986)
Mujluf, 1984; Narayanan,1988)
Leverage is positively correlated with firm No:Castanias(1983)
value(Ross,1977)
Leverage is positively correlated with the Yes: Kim &Sorensen(1986)
extent of managerial ownerships No: Friend Lang(1988)
(Leland& Pyles,1977)
Firm tend to issue equity when Yes: Korajczyk,et al(1990a)
information asymmetry is smallest
(Myers & Mujluf, 1984)
Corporate Control Model
Stock price increase on announcement Debt Issues
v
of debt issues, debt-for -equity Yes: Kim& Stulz (1988)
exchanges, or stock repurchases and No: Eckbo(1986)*
decreases on announcement of equity Debt-tor-Equityechanges
issues or equity-for -debt excahnsges( Yes: Masulis(1980, 1983)






Leverage is positively correlated with th Yes: Kim & Sorensen(1986)
extent of managerial equity ownership
(Harris & Raviv, 1988)
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COMPANY PROFILE
Mission Statement
"The leading Jamaican based trading organization that creates value for its
customer, principals and stockholders by providing quality goods and
services through the distribution of food and other products and provision of
services in finance, maritime activities, and information technology through a
motivated and competent staff."
Eighty years of continuous growth have made Grace, Kennedy one of the largest
and most dynamic corporate entities in Jamaica and the Caribbean. The company,
which began life as a small trading establishment and Wharf founders, on February
14, 1922, has expanded and diversified over the years. Today it comprises a
formidable network of some 62 subsidiaries and associated companies, employing
over 2000 staff members and operating in the areas of maritime, distribution,
finance, information technology and food manufacturing. (Organizational Chart)
A truly regional company, Grace, Kennedy is the only conglomerate listed on all
three Caribbean stock exchanges. As it gears itself to meet the challenges of the
future, Grace, Kennedy in 1995, developed a strategic plan which it has called the
"2020 Vision". This sets out the path, which the company will follow to increase
training of its staff and to employ state-of-the-art technology as tools to achieve
increased productivity and maintain the high quality of its goods and services.
Already the new policies and programmes have begun to prove their effectiveness




The Financial Services Division is perhaps the division that has experienced the
fastest growth in recent years with its rapidly expanding portfolio of services. The
companies of the Division provide a wide range of financial services including
general insurance, merchant banking, commercial banking, investment lease
financing and stock brokering. Recently the division launched the Caribbean's first
US$ mutual fund in Cayman.
• Allied Insurance Brokers Ltd. (general insurance brokerage)
• George & Branday Ltd. (merchant banking)
• H. Macaulay Orrett Insurance Ltd. (Life insurance brokerage)
• Jamaica International Insurance Co. Ltd. (general insurance)
• Knutsford Re (group fire &book debt insurance)
• First Global Commercial Bank Ltd. (commercial banking)
• First Global Stock Brokers Limited (Stock Brokers)
• Global Capital Leasing (Lease Finance)
• Grace, Kennedy Trade Finance (Trade Financing)
• Grace, Kennedy Capital Services Ltd.
Food Trading Division
The Food Trading Division comprises those companies which are involved in the
development, manufacturing and distribution of the Grace-owned food products, the
food products of its major principals, and a range of household products.
With branches in Belize, and Canada and with distributors in 25 countries, this
division currently has the widest international reach. Its range of exports includes
items under the Grace label, as well as other Grace owned brands. Products include
jams, jellies, sauces, condiments, juices, nectars, drink mixes and processed meats.
• Dairy Industries (Ja.) Ltd. (manufacture of dairy products)









Grace Food Processors Ltd. (processing of meat products)
Grace Food Processors (Canning) Ltd. (manufacture of canned products)
Grace, Foods and Services Company
World Brands Services Limited
Grace, Kennedy (Belize) Limited
Grace Foods International Limited
Grace, Kennedy (Ontario) Inc.
Grace, Kennedy (U.S.A) Inc.
Retail and Trading Division
The Retail and Trading Division is comprised of companies which focus on
the sale of pharmaceutical products, hardware and building supplies and farming
inputs, industrial catering and food retailing. Through a joint venture with Goddard
Enterprises Ltd. of Barbados, the division recently established Fidelity Motors
Limited, as the exclusive authorized distributor of new vehicles manufactured by
Nissan Motors Ltd. (Japan).
The companies in this division include:
• Agro-Grace Ltd. (retailing & trading of agricultural inputs)
• Hi-Lo Food Stores (Ja.) Ltd. (Island-wide chain of supermarkets)
• Industrial Catering Services Ltd. (industrial catering)
• Medi-Grace Ltd. (distribution of pharmaceuticals, and Caribbean Greetings
Cards)
• Rapid & Sheffield Co. Ltd. (retailing of hardware & building supplies)
• Versair In-Flite Services Ltd. (airline catering)
• Fidelity Motors
Information Services Division
The companies within the Information Services Division represent such well-
known international principals as Sprint International Communications Corporation
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(SPRINT) and Western Union. In 2001, the division introduced the Sprint collect call
service to Guyana.
Grace, Kennedy Remittance Services, Ltd - the flagship company of the division,
has aggressively implemented the representation of Western Union in Jamaica and
the Caribbean. Today the company boasts a network of 120 branches in Jamaica,
51 in Trinidad &Tobago, and 72 in Haiti, and 35 in Guyana.
In addition to the Western Union Money Transfer Services, GKRS Ltd. introduced FX
Trader cambio services, and Bill Express, a bill payment service, to the region
• The five companies in this Division are: Grace, Kennedy Remittance Services
Ltd. (GKRS) (Remittance Services)
• Grace, Kennedy Remittance Services (Guyana) Ltd. {remittance services}
• Grace, Kennedy (Trinidad & Tobago) Ltd. {remittance services}
• International Communications Ltd. (telecommunication products & services
and SPRINT representative)
Maritime Division
The Maritime Division is made up nine companies which provide a range of services
for the shipping industry including:
Stevedoring
Wharfage
Specialised security for port and marine vessels
Cold storage and reefer maintenance
Representation of international shipping lines
The companies in this Division include:
• Carib Star Shipping Ltd. (exclusive shipping agency)
x
• Grace, Kennedy & Co. (Shipping) Ltd. (general shipping agency)
• Harbour Cold Stores Ltd. (cold storage & warehousing)
• Hamburg-Sud/Columbus Ja. Ltd. (general shipping agency)
• International Shipping Ltd. (general shipping agency)
• Kingston Wharves Ltd. (wharf age operations)
• Port Services Ltd. (port haulage & stevedoring)
• Security Administrators Ltd.(port& Wharf security)
Source: http://www.gracekennedy.com
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VISION 2020
As Grace, Kennedy & Co. Ltd. gears itself to meet the challenges of the future, the
Company has set out its policy prescriptions in a programme which it has called
"2020 Vision". The vision was developed in 1995. Our vision is to be:
• A dynamic group comprising strong, viable business units.
• A group of business units that gives value to our customers not added cost.
• A Company whose consumers demand our products, our services and our
brands.
• Continuously increasing productivity to raise the standard of living of our staff.
• A high stock market value for our Company to benefit our shareholders, and
to lower the cost of capital.
• Ethical in our conduct of doing business.
• Responsible members of our community - "Grace - We Care"
• Truly international by acting on appropriate opportunities wherever they may
arise in the world.
XI
A critical component of our 2020 Vision is to earn at least 50% of our profits outside
of Jamaica by the year 2005.
Source: http://www.gracekennedy.com
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INTEREST RATES
Interest rates from different countries sources during the period 1998 to 2002.
(http://www.boLjm.com )
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1998
Jan. 25.32 29.00 6.84 7.00 5.09 5.00 4.18 4.50 8.20 11.00 11.69 13.0e
Feb. 24.83 29.00 6.88 7.00 5.11 5.00 4.57 5.00 8.20 11.00 11.84 13.0e
Mar. 24.56 29.00 6.95 7.00 5.03 5.00 4.56 5.00 8.10 10.50 11.89 13.0e
Apr. 24.21 26.50 7.02 7.00 5.00 5.00 4.82 5.00 7.90 10.50 11.93 13.00
May 23.79 25.00 6.99 7.00 5.03 5.00 4.75 5.00 7.90 10.30 11.90 13.00
June 23.25 24.00 7.29 8.00 4.99 5.00 4.88 5.00 8.20 10.30 11.93 13.00
July 22.60 23.00 7.22 8.00 4.96 5.00 4.93 5.00 8.30 10.50 11.88 13.00
Aug. 20.41 22.00 7.19 8.00 4.94 5.00 4.88 5.00 8.30 10.80 12.00 13.00
Sept. 20.34 22.00 6.94 8.00 4.74 5.00 4.94 5.75 8.50 10.80 11.93 13.00
Oct. 21.28 22.00 6.54 7.00 4.08 4.75 4.74 5.50 8.50 11.50 11.96 13.00
Nov. 20.25 22.00 6.31 7.00 4.44 4.50 4.81 5.25 9.00 11.50 12.11 13.00
XII
11.88 13.08.80 11.304.70 5.254.42 4.506.005.7222.0021.31Dec.
•
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1999
Jan. 20.33 22.00 5.28 6.00 4.34 4.50 4.66 5.25 10.50 11.00 11.57 13.0
Feb. 19.70 22.00 5.04 6.00 4.45 4.50 4.83 5.25 10.40 13.00 10.81 13.0
Apr. 19.27 20.75 4.90 5.00 4.28 4.50 4.60 5.00 12.40 15.00 10.57 13.0
May 19.70 18.85 4.93 5.00 4.51 4.50 4.42 4.75 12.10 14.80 10.32 13.0
June 18.33 18.85 4.75 5.00 4.59 4.50 4.62 4.75 11.90 14.50 10.07 13.0
July 18.22 18.85 4.76 5.00 4.60 4.50 4.64 4.75 11.10 14.30 10.11 13.0
Aug. 18.71 18.85 4.84 5.00 4.76 4.75 4.83 4.75 10.40 13.30 10.23 13.0
Sept. 17.52 18.35 5.07 5.00 4.73 4.75 4.69 4.75 11.20 14.00 10.17 13.0
Oct. 17.51 18.35 5.25 5.00 4.88 4.75 4.85 4.75 11.00 13.80 10.05 13.0
Nov. 18.41 18.35 5.20 6.00 5.07 5.00 4.81 5.00 10.80 13.50 10.08 13.0
Dec. 18.68 18.35 5.49 6.00 5.23 5.00 4.93 5.00 11.00 13.30 10.09 13.0
2000
Jan. 18.63 18.35 5.72 6.00 5.34 5.00 5.07 5.00 10.70 13.50 10.14 13.0
Feb. 18.71 18.35 5.83 6.00 5.57 5.25 5.05 5.25 10.70 13.25 10.09 13.0
Mar. 16.48 17.30 5.86 6.00 5.72 5.50 5.28 5.50 10.60 13.50 10.24 13.01
Apr. 16.16 17.00 5.90 6.00 5.67 5.50 5.45 5.50 10.50 13.00 10.14 13.01
May 16.21 17.00 5.95 6.00 5.92 6.00 5.75 6.00 10.30 13.00 10.61 13.01
June 16.06 17.00 5.85 6.00 5.74 6.00 5.55 6.00 10.20 13.00 10.87 13.01
July 15.95 16.75 5.83 6.00 5.93 6.00 5.63 6.00 9.80 12.50 10.71 13.0!
Aug. 15.70 16.45 5.80 6.00 6.11 6.00 5.62 6.00 9.70 12.25 10.61 13.0e
XIII
Sept. 15.78 16.45 5.80 6.00 5.99 6.00 5.56 6.00 9.10 12.25 10.74 13.01
Oct.*** 16.45 5.75 6.00 6.10 6.00 5.62 6.00 8.80 11.50 10.94 13.01
Nov. 15.91 16.45 5.69 6.00 6.18 6.00 5.74 6.00 8.90 11.25 10.82 13.01

























Jan. 17.70 16.45 5.49 6.00 5.27 5.00 5.14 5.75 8.90 11.50 10.38 13.0
Feb. 16.75 16.45 5.46 6.00 4.93 5.00 4.80 5.75 8.90 11.50 10.39 13.0
Mar. 15.57 15.50 5.23 6.00 4.50 4.50 4.60 5.25 9.40 12.00 10.42 13.0
Apr. 15.25 15.50 5.12 6.00 3.91 4.00 4.41 5.00 9.10 12.00 10.17 13.0
May 14.35 14.75 4.98 5.00 3.66 3.50 4.40 4.75 8.90 11.50 9.10 13.0
June 14.99 14.25 4.98 5.00 3.48 3.25 4.24 4.75 8.50 11.00 9.69 13.0
July 15.37 14.25 5.01 5.00 3.54 3.25 4.03 4.50 7.70 10.30 8.84 13.0
Aug. 14.85 14.25 4.72 5.00 3.39 3.00 3.80 4.25 6.70 9.30 6.39 13.0
Sept. 14.04 14.25 4.43 5.00 2.87 2.50 3.04 3.75 6.40 9.00 6.83 13.01
Oct. 14.06 14.25 4.16 4.00 2.22 2.00 2.54 3.00 6.20 8.80 5.36 13.01
Nov. 16.37 14.25 3.78 4.00 1.93 1.50 2.21 2.50 6.40 9.00 6.05 13.01
Dec. 15.70 14.25 3.83 4.00 1.72 1.25 2.00 2.50 6.30 8.80 6.49 13.01
2002
Jan.
Feb. 14.76 13.75 3.87 4.00 1.73 1.25 2.07 2.25 5.90 8.30 5.58 13.0(
Mar. 13.35 13.25 3.97 4.00 1.81 1.25 2.34 2.25 5.88 8.30 5.60 13.0e
XIV
Apr. 12.95 13.25 3.97 4.00 1.72 1.25 2.41 2.50 5.74 8.00
5.19 13.e
May 12.90 13.25 3.95 4.00 1.74 1.25 2.62 2.50 5.49 7.80
4.60 13.0
June 12.92 13.25 3.98 4.00 1.71 1.25 2.74 2.75 5.49 7.80 5.05 7.7
July+ 12.90 12.95 3.84 4.00 1.68 1.25 2.85 3.00 4.45 6.75 4.55 7.7
Aug. 12.89 12.95 3.77 4.00 1.63 1.25 3.00 3.00 4.45 6.75 4.25 7.2
Sept. 15.40 12.95 3.79 4.00 1.63 1.25 2.83 3.00 3.93 6.25 4.13 7.2
Oct. 17.80 12.95 3.75 4.00 1.59 1.25 2.81 3.00 4.01 6.25 4.22 7.2
Nov. 15.58 12.95 3.80 4.00 1.25 0.83 2.73 3.00 3.91 6.25 4.00 7.2 '










Jan. 16.90 12.95 3.80 4.00 1.17 2.25 2.81 3.00 2.88 6.25 4.60 7 .2~
Feb.++ 12.95 3.50 4.00 1.16 2.25 2.86 3.00 2.88 5.25 4.68 7.2~
Mar. 28.68 12.95 0.00 1.12 2.25 3.14 3.25 0.00 O.OC
*30-day Maturity
***Jamaica had no Treasury bill issue for October 2000
+ Revised
++ There were no Treasury bills Issued for Jamaica
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SOURCES OF FUNDS-DEBT
Bank and Short term Loans
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Secured assets 81,491 82,419 108,922 121,085 58,449
xv
Unsecured 698,201 873,388 931,991 1,343,744 1,195,668
Total 779,692 955,807 1,040,913 1,464,829 1,254,117
LIT Liabilities
Bank Loans 378,060 693,965 548,718 526,063 645,440
Mortqaqe Loans 14,312 10,306 14,853 61,865 62,321
other 37,355 10,795 20,856 62,857 0
Customer deposits 0 9,915 47,454 1,500 4,315
Financial lease 12,518 7,369 19,408 23,910 35,452
Associated company 0 34,050 40,334 0 0
Total Group UT liabilities 280,144 629,695 600,827 581,804 613,998
Secured on assets 223,413 203,705
Unsecured 452,782 543,823
676,195 747,528
secured on assets n/v 255,732 250,113
Unsecured ** n/v 510,668 441,510
Source: obtained from Annual report 1998 -2002
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The company Sources of finance from 1998-2002 (Year ended 31 December)
EQUITY
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
NO.of shares issued 180,491 180,491 216,588 266,887 323,075
shareholders 'equity per unit (BV) 20.39 23.5 17.95 19.4 27.47
Market capitalisation 3,682,016 4,241,539, 3,887,755 5,177,608 8,875,390
Shareholders Capital 180,491 180,491 216,588 266,887 323,075
Capital Reserves 1,806,872 2,001,798 2,380,861 2,779,571 3,239,828
Other Reserves 334,438 374,189 543,672 674,971 1,006,699
Total Reserve** 2,141,310 2,375,987 2,924,533 3,454,542 4,246,527
XVI
Retained Income 1,660,996 1,961,119 2,263,654 2,712,458 3,263,261
Total shareholders equity 3,982,797 4,517,597 5,404,775 6,433,887 7,832,86:
Net Cash Position** 1,073,000 977,000 1,400,000 1,512,000 2,393,00C
Cash and cash equivalents at year end 2,302,262 2,767,590 3,200,432 6,162,953 11,222,1 H
Cash from operation activities * 590,867 957,867 1,290,628 2,468,641
Source: obtained from GKL's annual report 1998-2002
APPENDIX IX (page, 55)
CAPITAL RESERVES
Grace Kennedy Limited and Capital Reserves during period 1998 to 2002
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
a.
Transfer from profit and loss 171,407 205,814 225,581 303,233 423,075
account
b.
Share premium 15,356 15,356 15,356 88,464 125,798
Realized gains on disposal of 96,923 97,317 101,214 101,241 77,604
assets
Capital distributions received 28,507 32,993 38,515 38,515 38,515
Par value of bonus shares 5,652 5,652 36,872 36,872 36,872
received
Bonus shares issued (41,803) (41,803) (41,803) (41,803) (41,803)
Asset replacement, rehabilitation - - - 8,623 19,927
and dep. Reserves
Profits capitalised by group 612,282 814,527 1,031,529 1,321,904 1,760,140
companies
Unrealised surplus on revaluation 1,194,300 1,165,636 1,289,118 1,279,334 1,279,334
of fixed assets
Goodwill arisinQ on consolidation (110,565) (92,789) (92,789) (60,458) (60,630)
Other 6,220 4,909 2,849 4,906 4,071
1,806,872 2,001,798 2,380,861 2,779,571 3,239,828
Total Reserves
Source: obtained from GKL's annual report 1998-2002
XVII
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Cash and cash equivalent
Statement of Cash Flows
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Sources I(uses) of Cash
1.0peratinQ activities 318,645 590,666 957,867 1,290,628 2,468,641
2.Financing activities 81 107,839 (75,877) 263,059 432,479
3.lnvestinQ activities (168,358) (485,539) (567,682) (1,594,O72) 595,426
4.Exchanqe and translatetion 3,290 15,580 1,743,452 9,551 44,451
qains on net foreiqn cash balances
5.Cash & cash equivalents beginning
of year 1,361,248 1,514,906 33,750 1,375,984 1,345,150
Cash and cash equivalents at year end 1,514,906 1,743,452 2,091,510 1,345,150 4,886,147
Cash and Short- term investments
Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$
'000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Cash and cash equivalents at year end 1,514,906 1,743,452 2,091,510 1,345,150 4,886,147
Cash and short-term investments 11,222,21
2,302,262 2,767,590 3,200,432 6,162,953 9
Net Cash position (FCF)***
1,073,000 977,000 1,400,000 1,512,000 2,393,000
*** cash& short- term investments less total gearing, deposit payable and securities sold under
agreement to repurchase)
xvm
Source: obtained from GKL's annual report 1998-2002
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a. GKL and Group Profitability
Profitability
Year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Market capitalisation 3,682,016 4,241,539 3,887,755 5,177,608 12,276,900
Turnover 13,543,858 14,063,653 14,103,956 15,442,090 18,309,534
Operatinq Income 345,101 248,504 377,332 760,534 995,001
Pre-tax Profit 695,711 832,499 1,030,077 1,333,249 1,749,746
Profit After Tax 555,341 650,086 769,630 1,056,976 1,453,822
Net profit attributable to S/Hs 505,790 587,010 721,519 1,010,320 1,419,243
Net Dividend-amount 56,395 81,221 90,246 116,260 166,605
EPS* 1.57 1.82 2.23 3.13 4.39
Interest expenses 475,964 434,160 630,107 1,060,394
Depreciation 208,676 234,164 288,611 361,367
corporate tax 33.33 % 140,370 182,413 260,447 276,273 295,924
Taxation recoverable 76,840 211,670 280,846 302,307 291,791
Cash from oprationq activities * 590,867 957,867 1,290,628 2,468,641
b. GKL and Profitability Contributed by Sector
XIX
Contribution to Pre-Tax Profit Bv Sector 1998-2002
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
JM$ '000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Sector
Food Trading 81.3 41.9 67.2 266.1 358.5
Retail & Trading 153.8 177.1 146.5 105.6 128.5
Financial 149.4 190.6 280 386.6 683.7
Maritime 135.1 103.2 118.1 86 134.8
Information 176.2 319.7 418.3 489 444.2
Total 695.8 832.5 1030.1 1333.3 1749.7
Source: obtained from annual report 1998-2002
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DEGREE COMBINED LEVERAGE
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
'000 '000 '000 '000 '000
Pre-tax Profit 695,711 832,499 1,030,077 1,333,249 1,749,746
Interests
441,381 475,964 434,160 630,107 1,060,394
Pre-tax profit(incl.interest) 1,137,092 1,308,463 1,464,237 1,963,356 2,810,140
DFL = PBIT I PAIBT
Pretax profit(incl.interest) 1,137,092 1,308,463 1,464,237 1,963,356 2,810,140
PAIBT
695,711 832,499 1,030,077 1,333,249 1,749,746
DFL
1.63 1.57 1.42 1.47 1.61
DOL (% changes in NOli % changes in Sales)
% changes in PBIT 10.2 19.7 23.7 29.4 31.2
% changes in Sales 2.2 3.8 0.3 9.5 18.6
DOL














IDel - DOL*DFl 7.56 8.13 2.69 4.55 2.71 I
Source: calculated from information from annual report 1998-2002
APPENDIX XIII (page 75)
Questionnaire
Instructions:
Please choose the option of following questions that you feel most appropriate relating to the
decisions you make in raising new capital.
SECTION 1
lkPlease indicate the relative importance of the following principles your company
adopts in deciding the capital structure (please tick X on the relevant number)
a. We strive to maintain an approximately constant long term debt! equity ratio
o 1 2 3* 4
Not Slightly Somewhat Important Very
Important Important Important Important
----1------------1--------------1-----------1------------1----
b. We follow an order of priority. Exhaust the most advantageous sources of funds
before using other sources
o 1 2 3 4*
Not Slightly Somewhat Important Very
Important Important Important Important
----1------------1--------------1-----------1------------1----
XXI
2). Attitude to Funding Sources
Please rank the following capital raising instruments according to your firm's order
of preference. (1 = most preferred, 5 = least preferred)
_1__ Internal equity (retained earning)
_3_ External (new) common stock
2 Bank debt
_4_ Non-bank straight debt
5 Non- bank convertible debt---
3). Features Associated with Equity and Debt Issues
Please fill X into of the following options according to your practice in making
capital structure decisions. (Can choose more than one answer)
3.1. Under what circumstances would you make use of Retained Income?
_ *__when equity is expensive
_*_when debt is expensive
_*_when the company is expanding its internal operations
when we have retained income available---
other--- ---------------------
3.2. Under what circumstances would you make use of Equity issues?
_*__To fund a major expansion and acquisition
___When debt is expensive
___To reduce leverage
_*__Ifmarket conditions are right (fair, under, or overvalued by the market)
___To reduce leverage ifmarket conditions are right
others
--- --------------------
3.3. Under what circumstances would you make use of Debt issues?
_*_To fund a major expansion and acquisitions
___When internal sources of fund has already exhausted
XXII
_*_To add to liquidity
If market conditions are right---
_*_To fund long-term assets ifmarket conditions are right
___other _
4). Please indicate the relative importance of the following factors in governing your firm's
financing decision in choosing among internal equity (Le., retained earnings), external equity,
or external debt. (Likert Scale: 0 = Not Important, 1 = Slightly Important, 2 = Somewhat
Important, 3 =Important, 4 =Very Important)
o 1 2 3 4
a) Cost of underwriting X
b) Tax savings on interest expenses X
c) Avoiding under pricing of securities to be issued X
d) Maintaining comparability with firms in the industry X
e) Matching maturity of assets and liabilities X
f) Correcting mispricing of outstanding securities X
g) Probability of becoming insolvent X
h) Projected cash flows from the assets to be financed X
i) Restrictive covenants of senior securities X
j) Risk of being taken over X
k) Voting Control X
I) Whether market conditions are favourable to a particular source of financing X
m) Stock market reaction to the issue, and signalling tool to investors X
n) Effects on cost of capital X
0) Maximization shareholders' wealth X
p) Financial flexibility X
q) Corporate strategic planning principle X
r) Credit rating and reputation X
5. What is the percentage of equity in your company's capital structure?
XXIII
More than 80 %
* Between 60% and 80 %
Between 40 % and 60 %
Between 20 % and 60 %
Less than 10 %
6. The recent Jamaica economy ("0" for strongly disagree and "4" for strongly
disagree) o 12 3 4
a. Has an impact on my company's choices of financing mix x
b. Affect availability of different sources of capital x
c. Affects the preference of equity over debt as source of capital x
d. Affects the preference of debt over equity as source of capital x
Explain:
7. The total of your firm intangible assets over total assets is
over 10%---
Between 5% and 10%--_.
___between 1% and 5%
* other
8. The percentage of equity held by the management of the company is
___Over 50%
___Between 40 % and 50 %
XXIV
Between 20 % and 30 %
---
* Between 10 % and 20 %
Less than 10%---
9. What is your firm's total market value of equity? (JM$)
Answer: _
10. What is your firm's Weighted Average Cost of Capital?
Answer: _
11. How would you describe your firm's future investment opportunities?
Answer: _
12. How is your firm current strategy affecting your firm debt-to-equity mix?
Answer: -------------------------
13. How risky is your firm position in industry? What are main sources of these
risks?
Answer: --------------------------
14. Given that new profitable investment opportunity cannot be taken without
doing one of the following, your firm will most likely choose to:
_*_Depart from the target debt! equity ratio
Cut dividends
Sell off other assets
__Pass up the profitable investment
xxv
15. According to your estimation, your firm's outstanding securities are priced
fairly by the market for:
* More than 80% of the time
Between 50 % and 80 % of the time---
Between 20 % and 50 % of the time---
Less than 20 % of the times---
16. The tax structure of Jamaica is favorable for which financing source?
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Summary of the relationship between evidence form Grace, Kennedy Limited and
Capital Structure theories
A capital structure theory or concept is listed in the first column, followed by the
related evidence found from Grace, Kennedy Limited in the column.
Theory or Concept Grace, Kennedy Limited evidence Y N
I. Trade-offbenefits and costs • Corporate interest deductions moderately X
of debt (Myers, 1986). important
Often taxes benefits are • Cash flow volatility important X
traded offwith expected • Financial distress and bankruptcy costs is X
distress costs (MM,1963) important
• Maintain financial flexibility is important X
• Related to firm has target debt ratio
X
2. Firm has target DIE ratio; • Same industry debt ratios is important X
A static version of the trade off • GKL has some what strict targetl range X
implies that firm has an • GKL has no target debt ratio X
optimal, target debt ratio.
3. the effect of transactions • Transactions costs affect debt policy X
costs on DIE ratios; • Transaction costs make GKL prefer X
Transaction costs can affect the internal generated funds.
cost of external funds. Firms
may avoid or delay issuing or
retiring security because of
issuance costs Fisher et al.
(1989).
4. Pecking Order Theory of • Financial flexibility
financing hierarchy; • Desire for flexibility is unrelated to degree
Financial securities can be of information asymmetry(size) or growth
undervalued due to information status
asymmetry between managers • Issue debt only when internal fund
and investors. Firm should use insufficient
securities in reverse order of • No relation to growth or dividend status
asymmetry: use of internal • Equity issue only internal fund is~ ..
XXVII
funds first, debt second, insufficient
convertible security third, • Equity issuance decision affected by
equity last. equity undervaluation
To avoid need for external • POT has no relation to size, dividend
funds firm may prefer to store status, executive ownership
excess cash( Myers & Majluf, • Equity issuance decision unaffected by
1984) ability too obtain fund from debt,
convertibles, or other sources
5. Stock price: •
Firm with low leverage issue
equity when their valuation is
high. Firm with high leverage
issue equity when there
valuation is low.
6. Credit rating • In general, rating is very important to debt
decision
7. Interest rates • Issue debt when interest rates low
8. Underinvestment: firm may • Growth status has no effect on relative use x
pass up NPV>O project of SIT debt
because profits flow to • Growth status affects relative important of x
existing bondholders. Can debt policy
attenuate by limiting debt • Borrowing SIT to avoid underinvestment x
or SIT debt. more severe
for growth
firms(Myers, 1977)
9. Asset substitution: • Restrictive covenants are important X
shareholders take on risky considerations in borrowing.
projects to expropriate Company has no problem regards
wealth from assets substitution. GKL makes
bondholders(Jensen& investments on projects that meet
Meckiling, 1976) investment criteria.
10. Industry norms and Debt • GKL takes Industry Norm into x
policy. Debt ratios are account when decides it capital
industry specific (Bradley structure
et al.,1984)
11. Corporate control (Hams • Equity issued to dilute holdings of X
and Raviv, 1988) particular shareholders
12. Risk management: finance • Foreign debt is frequently viewed as a X
foreign operation with natural hedge
foreign debt as a means of
hedging FX risk
13. Maturity-matching: • Important to choice between SIT and x
matching maturity between LIT debt
assets and liabilities
14. Employee stocklbonus • When funding employee plans, firms
plans: shares of stock need avoid issuing shares, which would x
XXVIII
to implement employee dilute the holding of existing
compensation plans shareholders.
• The company has Stock Option plan
to management and employees x
15. Bargaining with • Debt policy is used as a bargaining x




16. EPS dilution • Important too equity issuance decision x
17. Debt is used to signal • GKL use debt to signal optimism in x
production decisions( its operation.
Ross,1977)
18. Equity ownership of • Company used proportion of x
management used to signal managers' shares ownership to signal
project quality(Leland and the quality of projects.
Pyles, )
19. Corporate planning • The most important factor influences x
principle debt policy
XXIX
